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Humankind is on a path of inefficient and unsustainable resource 
use and exploitation. As a result, the earth and its resources are now 
facing irreversible disruptions that have the potential to affect 
multiple generations.1 These disastrous global effects are not only 
caused by excessive resource use. Rather, accelerated human use of 
resources also has the devastating consequence of impairing the 
purely ecocentric benefits that follow when humans do not use 
resources. When resources are left alone by humans, when they are 
not exploited or developed, their nonuse is beneficial for the entire 
biosphere, of which humans are only a part. 
In this Article, we show how the destruction of this critical nonuse 
component of natural resources is creating many of the alarming 
environmental changes that are so disturbing to the planet. Then, 
through a series of analytical arguments founded in economic game 
theory, we illustrate that sustainable resource use can only be 
achieved if legal rights are bestowed upon not just human resource 
users, or humans who benefit themselves from resource nonuse, but 
also upon the resource itself. We define this legal right as the 
resource’s “right of nonuse.” Establishing a “right of nonuse” 
effectively privatizes a resource, facilitating a cooperative game that 
is between three kinds of players: human resource users, humans who 
selfishly prefer resource nonuse, and the resource itself. An analysis 
under this three-player game, which at last includes the natural 
resource itself as a critical actor, provides a framework for moving 
toward an efficient, sustainable path of resource conservation. 
 
1 Among the most obvious of these disruptions are diminishing energy supplies and 
usable natural resources, adverse climate change, and accelerating loss of biodiversity. 
THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, HOT, FLAT, AND CROWDED 37–47 (2008); see also P.C.D. Milly 
et al., Stationarity is Dead: Whither Waste Management, 319 SCIENCE 573, 573 (2008) 
(arguing that the customary belief that natural systems fluctuate within a narrow, 
predictable range is no longer true, due to “substantial anthropogenic change” of the 
Earth’s climate); Robert J. Diaz & Rutger Rosenberg, Spreading Dead Zones and 
Consequences for Marine Ecosystems, 321 SCIENCE 926, 926 (2008) (“Dead zones in the 
coastal oceans have spread exponentially since the 1960s [and are] . . . fueled by riverine 
runoff of fertilizers and the burning of fossil fuels.”). 
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I 
DEFINING NATURAL RESOURCE USE AND NONUSE 
A.  Natural Resource Use and Nonuse Values 
Resources consist of both a use and nonuse component, 
summarized in Table 1.2 
The use dimension in turn is divided into two classes: direct use 
and indirect use. Direct use occurs when humans utilize, exploit, or 
otherwise disturb a resource. We value this direct use component 
when we extract, develop, cultivate, or change some natural raw 
material for human ends.3 The use component of resources is 
exploited when we deposit our waste directly into the natural 
environment, using the atmosphere, hydrosphere, and the earth’s soils 
as sinks for our pollutants.4 Returns from direct use can be measured 
rather easily through market activity, such as price and quantity sold 
or other economic measures. Direct uses may also include 
nonconsumptive uses, such as visiting a national park for wildlife 
viewing.5 These uses may not appear to be outwardly destructive, but 
human visitation in great enough numbers can harm both wildlife and 
the benefit humans experience from viewing animals in the wild. 
Many direct uses are quasi-public or congestible public goods. They 
are nonrivalrous and nonexclusive at low levels of consumption, but 
become congested at high levels of use. Resource use may also 
encompass “indirect uses” derived from a resource or an ecosystem,  
  
2 Information in Table 1 is adapted from IAN HODGE, JESSICA DUNN & ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RURAL CHANGE AND SUSTAINABILITY: A REVIEW OF 
RESEARCH 139 (1992) and JONATHAN A. LESSER, DANIEL E. DODDS & RICHARD O. 
ZERBE, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 268–82 (1997). 
3 See generally JAN G. LAITOS, SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MARY C. WOOD & DANIEL H. 
COLE, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 724–1158 (2006) (discussing laws applying to the 
human uses of land, timber, minerals, and water). 
4 John R. McNeill, Resource Exploitation and Over-Exploitation: A Look at the 20th 
Century, in EXPLOITATION AND OVER-EXPLOITATION IN SOCIETIES PAST AND PRESENT 
51, 55 (Brigittta Benzing & Bernd Herrmann eds., 2003); see also JOHN S. APPLEGATE, 
JAN G. LAITOS JEFFREY GABA & NOAH SACHS, THE REGULATION OF TOXIC 
SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS WASTES (forthcoming 2d ed. 2011) (manuscript at ch. 5) 
(on file with authors) (discussing regulatory definitions and regulations of hazardous waste 
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act). 
5 Ruth DeFries & Stefano Pagiola, Analytical Approaches for Assessing Ecosystem 
Condition and Human Well-Being, in ECOSYSTEMS AND HUMAN WELL-BEING: CURRENT 
STATE AND TRENDS 54 (Rashid Hassan, Robert Scholes & Neville Ash eds., 2005). 
  
306 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 303 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
such as carbon sequestration, clear air, or clean water.6 Indirect uses 
can provide life-giving services and functions to this planet (including 
its humans) when humans do not directly use the resource.7 
In contrast, nonuse benefits arise when humans want to maintain 
the option of using a resource in the future (otherwise known as 
option value), or preserve a resource for the sake of its existence  
6 For the sake of clarity, throughout this Article and unless otherwise mentioned, the 
term use refers strictly to direct resource use. We distinguish indirect use when relevant. 
7 J. B. RUHL, STEVEN KRAFT & CHRISTOPHER LANT, THE LAW AND POLICY OF 
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES 27–32 (2007). 
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(otherwise known as existence value).8 Nonuse values can also 
produce global ecosystem services that permit sustainable life on the 
earth, even if there are no humans or if a resource is untouched by 
humans.9 Resource nonuse provides for the indirect resources that are 
received and enjoyed by humans. Both indirect use and existence 
nonuse values can also be measured, but it can be tricky to do so.10 
Within each resource on the earth, the use and nonuse components 
exist within a closed system;11 this means that if humans “use” a 
resource, then that use diminishes the resource’s nonuse potential.12 
We maintain that the human rate of resource use has changed over  
8 John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 779–82 
(1967). There are differences in opinion among economists as to whether option value is a 
subcategory of nonuse or whether it should comprise a third category by itself. See also 
LESSER ET AL., supra note 2 at 268–82. 
9 See generally NATURE’S SERVICES: SOCIETAL DEPENDENCE ON NATURAL 
ECOSYSTEMS (Gretchen C. Daily ed., 1997) (providing an overview of the services nature 
provides that benefit humans, as well as those that sustain life in general); HERMAN E. 
DALY & JOSHUA FARLEY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS 
77–110 (2004) (describing the relationship between resources, their consumption and 
nonconsumption, the economy, and ecology); Gordon B. Bonan, Forests and Climate 
Change: Forcings, Feedbacks, and the Climate Benefits of Forests, 320 SCIENCE 1444 
(2008) (explaining the beneficial effects of forests, when not removed by humans, on 
climate). On the other hand, human overuse of resources can dramatically adversely affect 
the earth’s nonuse value. See generally Richard A. Kerr, How Urgent is Climate Change?, 
318 SCIENCE 1230 (2007) (explaining that human-produced greenhouse gases could 
transform forty percent of existing global ecosystems by the year 2100). 
10 LESSER ET AL., supra note 2, at 268–82. 
11 Resource economists generally agree that there is a finite resource base of 
exhaustible resources. See, e.g., DALY & FARLEY, supra note 9, at 77–88; JOHN E. 
TILTON, ON BORROWED TIME? ASSESSING THE THREAT OF MINERAL DEPLETION 101–23 
(2003). Although the base itself is finite, economically viable reserves of exhaustible 
resources such as oil frequently increase with improvements in technology. See, e.g., 
DALY & FARLEY, supra note 9, at 78; TILTON, supra, at 101–05. Price signals rise to 
indicate presence of scarcity, which will mean that oil extraction will become prohibitively 
expensive before the last drop of oil is actually extracted. However, mineral economists 
have had difficulty projecting when these reserves will become uneconomical to maintain. 
See TILTON, supra, at 101–23. Renewable resources require more sophisticated modeling, 
and the success of replenishing these resources depends upon a number of variables, 
including initial stock, rate of use, regeneration rate, and resource carrying capacity. For an 
excellent depiction of renewable resource modeling, readers are recommended to consult 
JON M. CONRAD, RESOURCE ECONOMICS (1999) and JON M. CONRAD & COLIN W. 
CLARK, RESOURCE ECONOMICS: NOTES AND PROBLEMS (2002 reprt. ed.). 
12 All natural resources conform to the laws of thermodynamics. Consistent with the 
first law—the law of conservation of matter—any activation of a resource’s use dimension 
will also have a depressing effect on that resource’s nonuse qualities. And, consistent with 
the second law—the law of increased entropy—human use of a resource converts usable 
energy into unusable energy, deteriorating the resource’s ability to generate nonuse 
benefits. See generally DONALD HAVME, BIOLOGICAL THERMODYNAMICS (2001). 
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time, and that the current levels are unsustainable to humankind in the 
long run. Central to our thesis is the belief that a resource’s nonuse 
value can directly facilitate the resource’s indirect uses that are 
necessary for human life.13 
When hominids first emerged, demands on the resource nonuse 
component dominated because these early humans were not yet 
sufficiently numerous or technologically sophisticated to directly 
affect the earth’s resource use base.14 Indeed, some resource features, 
such as naturally-occurring abrupt climate changes, threatened our 
species’ very survival during the Pleistocene Epoch.15 But, from the 
Pleistocene-Holocene boundary about 11,500 years ago16 to the 
present time, anthropogenic use decisions have created a significant 
human footprint, which has in turn diminished the nonuse value and 
indirect use value of the planet’s resources.17 As a result, we face an 
unprecedented time when human exploitation of the use component 
of resources so degrades the nonuse component that the extinction of 
these human users is now a realistic possibility.18 
 
13 For example, the nonuse value of air is the following: When it is not polluted by 
humans, air provides critical components to the biosphere, such as oxygen, that confer on 
humans and other species an important indirect use value. Humans may place value on the 
existence of clean air for the support of species other than humans. 
14 Leendert P. Louwe Kooijmans, Archaeological Approaches to the Long-Term 
History of the Landscape, in EXPLOITATION AND OVER-EXPLOITATION IN SOCIETIES 
PAST AND PRESENT, supra note 4, at 63, 64, 69 (explaining that early hunters and foragers 
had little impact on the environment, surviving with subsistence activities). 
15 Harvey Weiss, Beyond the Younger Dryas: Collapse as Adaptation to Abrupt 
Climate Change in Ancient West Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF HUMAN RESPONSE 75, 75 
(Garth Bawden & Richard Martin Reycraft eds., 2000). 
16 The Pleistocene-Holocene boundary is generally considered a major transitional 
point in human social evolution. See id.; Rolf Peter Sieferle, Sustainability in a World 
History Perspective, in EXPLOITATION AND OVER-EXPLOITATION IN SOCIETIES PAST AND 
PRESENT, supra note 4, at 123, 128. Prior to that boundary, highly variable climates and 
environments made agriculture impossible, while afterwards more complex and 
coordinated agricultural societies could emerge. Sieferle, supra, at 128. 
17 See Mark Serreze & Julienne Stroeve, Standing on the Brink, NATURE REPS. 
CLIMATE CHANGE (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.nature.com/climate/2008/0811/full 
/climate.2008.108.html; Richard A. Kerr, Global Warming Is Changing the World, 316 
SCIENCE 188, 188 (2007). 
18 An Epidemic of Extinctions: Decimation of Life on Earth, INDEPENDENT (May 16, 
2008), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/nature/an-epidemic-of-
extinctions-decimation-of-life-on-earth-829325.html; Kenneth R. Weiss, 25% of Mammals 
May Face Extinction, DENV. POST, Oct. 7, 2008, at 13A, available at 
http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_10654051. 
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This Article provides a taxonomy of the influences that have 
guided our choices about resource use and nonuse. Initially, human 
survival behaviors, organizing institutions, changing legal regimes, 
and assumptions about relative resource abundance drove human 
decisions that eventually caused inefficient use of resources. These 
humans, past and present, then realized that their ability to improve 
their quality of life with respect to resources depended on what other 
humans wanted to do with these same resources. This 
interdependence means that human choices to use or not use resources 
became, in effect, a game of strategy.19 The outcome of this resource 
game depended on how the players acted in response to the actions of 
other players. This Article therefore relies on game theory to examine 
how and why the relevant resource players, and their assumptions 
about resource use and nonuse, have affected the earth’s resource 
base over time in different ways. 
As different resource players emerged throughout human history, 
so did the outcome of their “games,” as well as their likelihood of 
achieving equilibrium among the players. At first the games were 
between two classes of resource users—those who owned the right to 
use the resource and those who did not yet possess such a use right, 
but who wanted to acquire it. Then, as these user-use games created 
havoc in the resources market, a new non-player emerged—the 
person or group of people who believed they would be better off if 
resources were not used. Their interests increasingly needed legal 
recognition and official “resource player” status before there could be 
an optimal outcome. When laws and legal institutions granted 
resource nonusers the right to assert their anthropocentric interests in 
resource nonuse, the user and nonuser players strategized against each 
other over time in a different resource game between resource users 
and nonusers. 
It is the central thesis of this Article that this game, which 
characterizes virtually all resource disputes in the twenty-first 
century, is doomed to fail. It will never achieve an optimal level of 
sustainable resource use, or an adequate protection of resource nonuse 
values, or a cooperative game among the critical resource players. 
This failure is because the current resources game excludes a key 
player—the natural resource itself. Only that resource can adequately 
assert its own non-anthropocentric interests in not being used by  
19 DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GENTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY 
AND THE LAW 21 (1994). 
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humans. The resource nonuse values that are now asserted in resource 
games are primarily interests raised by human players who 
themselves would benefit anthropogenically by the resource nonuse. 
The natural resource’s purely ecocentric interests in nonuse—in being 
left alone by humans—are not part of these resource games. This 
Article argues that the creation of a legally acknowledged right of 
nonuse, held by the natural resource itself, would permit resource 
games to become cooperative games, and achieve an optimality that is 
impossible when the only players with legal rights are human users 
and nonusers. 
B.  Natural Resource Use and Nonuse Over Time 
We have so far experienced four distinct “eras” of resource use and 
nonuse. The first of these eras, which can be called the Age of Human 
Survival, occurred tens of thousands of years ago during the 
Pleistocene Epoch. During Era I, the players were semi-autonomous, 
and their relationship to resources was simply one of trying to survive 
in the face of nature’s raw and threatening power.20 The second era 
ran from the time human populations organized themselves into 
complex societies until roughly the eighteenth century, as the 
decentralized free market gradually emerged as the chief resource 
production allocating mechanism.21 In Era II, which can be called the 
Age of the Market, resource users were the primary players. Their 
goal was to quickly tap the seemingly endless resource use benefits 
before another competing user did so. In this race for resources, any 
rudimentary resource games were either between those who wished to 
use the same resource for the same purpose, or between those who 
wished to use a given resource for different purposes. 
From the eighteenth century until the middle of the twentieth 
century, the concept of a property right in a resource allowed owners 
to fully control and exploit the use component of their resources. 
Property interests became the engine for distributing diminishing 
resources in the face of escalating demands.22 During this time there  
20 David S. Gutzler, Human Response to Environmental Disruption, in 
ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF HUMAN RESPONSE, supra note 
15, at 213, 215–16 (“[G]igantic pre-Holocene warming and cooling events . . . must have 
had profound effects on life (including humans).”). 
21 See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS (Kathryn Sutherland ed., Oxford University Press 1993) (1776). 
22 Leonard Zobler, An Economic-Historical View of Natural Resource Use and 
Conservation, 38 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 189, 190 (1962). At the beginning of Era III, the 
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was also an emerging movement for “resource conservation,” which 
in the United States established federal agencies to ensure a 
sustainable path of resource use on public lands. Although agencies 
such as the U.S. Forest Service, which was created in 1905, and the 
National Park Service, founded in 1916, eventually grew to protect 
nonuse values,23 the charter of these agencies was to ensure the 
availability of resources for future human use.24 During Era III, the 
Age of Property, the players were primarily resource users of 
competing uses who had no interest in the nonuse component of the 
resource they exploited. The two classes of players during Era III 
resource games were users with a property interest in the resource—
both public and private owners—and would-be users without a 
property interest. 
In Era IV, from the 1950s until the present, human anthropogenic 
decisions and activities resulted in dramatic reductions in the natural 
resource base, as well as increasing rates of pollution.25 These human 
actions so affected the use component of resources that the very 
nature of the earth’s biosphere not only became controlled by one  
specter of a depleted European resource base led to the exploration and colonization of 
North America, South America, and Africa. See id. at 189–90. 
23 About Us, U.S. NAT’L PARK SERVICE, http://www.nps.gov/aboutus (last visited Nov. 
16, 2010). 
24 See Organic Administration Act of 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11 (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 473–482, 581) (2006). Era III also witnessed an early movement for 
preservation and advocacy of resource nonuse, as opposed to conservation. Prominent 
activists during this era included the naturalist John Muir, and Aldo Leopold (founder of 
the Wilderness Society). Muir’s conflict with the first chief of the U.S. Forest Service, 
Gifford Pinchot, and advocacy of sustainable managed forestry became legendary. John 
M. Meyer, Gifford Pinchot, John Muir and the Boundaries of Politics in American 
Thought, 30 POLITY 267, 267–68 (1997). 
25 Wangari Maathai, World in Focus: The Seeds of Peace, 2006 WLNR11744115 (July 
8, 2006) (“[E]nvironmental degradation . . . and over-consumption continue to threaten the 
planet . . . .”); Tini Tran & John Heilprin, BROWN CLOUDS A GROWING RISK, DENV. 
POST, Nov. 14, 2008, at 14A, available at http://www.denverpost.com/headlines/ci 
_10978201 (commenting on “atmospheric brown clouds” covering vast areas of Asia, the 
Middle East, and Southern Africa). Of course, human damage to resource nonuse services 
did not first begin in the 1950s. Anthropogenic actions had been devastating landscapes 
and ecosystems long before the twentieth century. See David Rains Wallace et al., Not 
How, But Why? Beyond Proximate Cause for Environmental Degradation, 6 
CONSERVATION IN PRACTICE 42, 42–43 (2005) (reviewing JARED DIAMOND, COLLAPSE: 
HOW SOCIETIES CHOOSE TO FAIL OR SUCCEED (2005)); Malcolm Gladwell, The 
Vanishing, NEW YORKER, Jan. 3, 2005, at 70–73, available at http://www.newyorker 
.com/archive/2005/01/03/050103crbo_books (reviewing DIAMOND, supra). What occurred 
in the twentieth century is that we first began to realize the scope and extent of these 
nonuse damages. 
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species, its integrity and sustainability was also compromised.26 This 
realization, combined with loss of natural areas untouched by 
humans, led to laws that legitimated a new third player—humans who 
value resource nonuse.27 These Era IV laws that address the harmful 
impact of excessive resource use and loss of nature tend to focus on 
the use’s impact on individual humans, rather than on the resource or 
its environment.28 Indeed, the new third player empowered by these 
laws—the nonuser—often champions indirect and nonuse interests 
primarily because of the anthropocentric benefits that result from 
leaving resources alone.29 
Humans now so thoroughly dominate the earth, and are so 
pervasively the beneficiaries of its institutions, that our current Era IV 
may be termed the “Anthrocene” Age.30 This Article argues that there 
will not be a socially optimum equilibrium among three players 
(users, nonusers, and resource and land managers)31 to adequately  
26 For example, anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases seem to be a contributing 
factor as to why the earth has entered a new period of significant climate change. Richard 
B. Alley et al., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers, 
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 10 (Susan Solomon et al. eds., 
2007) available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf. 
27 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2006) (“[T]he purposes of [this Act] are 
. . . to protect . . . the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare 
and the productive capacity of its population.”); Ocean Dumping Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1401(b) 
(2006) (“[I]t is the policy of the United States to regulate the dumping of all types of 
materials into ocean waters . . . to prevent . . . any material which would adversely affect 
human health or…economic potentialities.”). Also, Era IV witnessed the emergence of 
subdisciplines of economics—such as environmental economics, resource economics, and 
experimental economics—which allowed us to better understand human interactions with, 
and preferences for, the environment and natural resources. See, e.g., JOHN VON 
NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 
(3rd. 1953); John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950). 
28 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 181 
(2000) (“The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing, however, is not injury 
to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”); National Environmental Policy Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006) (“[T]he continuing policy of the Federal Government . . . [is] to 
use all practicable means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to . . . maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the . . . 
requirement of . . . future generations of Americans.”); see also Gunther Handle, Human 
Rights and Protection of the Environment, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 
303, 304–05 (Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause, and Allan Rosas eds., 2d rev. ed. 2001). 
29 In 1997, the economic benefit of the nonuse “ecosystem services” provided to 
humans by productive natural systems unaffected by human interference was valued at 
between sixteen and fifty-four trillion dollars. Robert Constanza et al., The Value of the 
World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 259 (1997). 
30 ANDREW REVKIN, GLOBAL WARMING: UNDERSTANDING THE FORECAST 55 (1992). 
31 AVIWASH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. NALEBUFF, THINKING STRATEGICALLY: THE 
COMPETITIVE EDGE IN BUSINESS, POLITICS, AND EVERYDAY LIFE 77 (1991) (explaining 
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sustain the human population in the future in Era IV games.32 This is 
because resource use is competitive, which can be modeled as a non-
cooperative game that yields a Nash Equilibrium. In other words, 
each resource player maximizes his welfare given the best predicted 
strategy of the others. In the case of resource use, this results in a poor 
outcome for all.33 As a specific example, the suboptimal allocation of 
resources is due in part to government provisioning of public goods 
such as wildlife habitat or open space that may crowd out the 
altruistic behavior of private individuals, who might be willing to 
supply such non-market goods.34 Era IV laws give individuals, 
organizations, and governments the ability to raise their interests in 
resource nonuse or indirect uses. Even though nonuse values may be 
prioritized by some players, the resulting noncooperation leads to 
suboptimal resource use at a high rate. 
This Article urges that a natural resource’s nonuse component 
should be given legal stature—a right of nonuse—so that the resource 
can act as its own player, or agent, in resource games. When the 
resource is actually given legal rights, we will enter Era V, a new Age 
of Ecocentrism, where a sustainable social outcome can be reached. 
In Era V, a resource’s own nonuse interests can be considered 
credible by the three other resource players—owner-users, nonowner 
would-be users, and nonusers wishing to protect resource nonuse for 
their own anthropocentric objectives. And because the four players 
represent virtually all the relevant resource interests on this planet, 
establishing a right of nonuse effectively facilitates a cooperative 
game that will lead to an efficient, sustainable path of resource 
conservation.35  
that even if some equilibrium is reached among the players that may be best for those 
players, that result may not necessarily be best for society as a whole). 
32 See Roger B. Myerson, Nash Equilibrium and the History of Economic Theory, 
XXXVII J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 1067, 1069–70 (1999). 
33 Id. 
34 An excellent summary of this literature is presented in a seminal article by Theodore 
Bergstrom, Lawrence Blume & Hal Varian, On the Private Provision of Public Goods, 29 
J. PUB. ECONS. 25, 25–49 (1986), exploring the implications of private provisioning of 
public goods through a descriptive model and comparative statics. 
35 These four players would not necessarily be engaged in a simultaneous four-player 
game. Rather, it will be seen below that all resource players throughout the various eras 
have typically participated in a series of separate two-player, and occasional three-player, 
simultaneous and sequential games. Since owner-users and nonowner would-be users are 
essentially users of resources, most of the games in Era IV, the current time, have been 
between two players: users and nonusers, where the nonusers wish for the resource to be 
left alone for their own anthropocentric ends. Era V would introduce a critical third player, 
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II 
ERA I—THE AGE OF HUMAN SURVIVAL 
Modern humans emerged during a time called the Pleistocene 
Epoch, roughly tens of thousands of years ago. The first few early 
humans struggling to exist then were rather sparsely distributed and 
had little aggregate impact on the use component of resources.36 Our 
ancestors exploited easily accessible natural resources in order to gain 
a toehold in an environment that was harsh and threatening to this 
new species.37 Small groups of hunter-gatherers eked out a tenuous 
existence in highly variable environments and climates. The earth’s 
natural dimension proved to be a two-edged sword. On the one hand, 
resource stress was so frequent and dramatic that these populations 
constantly had to alter their behavior and locations to survive.38 On 
the other hand, their very survival depended on nature’s ecosystem 
services and benefits that provided them with the essentials of life.39 
During this time, humans depended upon group cooperation for 
individual survival. Since competition for resources was maladaptive, 
hunter-gatherers emphasized resource sharing between and within 
groups.40 The social rule among these hunting and gathering societies 
was egalitarianism, so as to ensure that no individual or group 
appropriated a disproportionate share of food. However, nomadic 
societies living in scattered small groups with limited cooperation 
could never enjoy the level of resource reliability and population  
the resource itself. The games that would emerge in Era V would be between users, human 
nonusers, and the resource. 
36 See generally Peter J. Richerson & Robert Boyd, Built for Speed: Pleistocene 
Climate Variation and the Origin of Human Culture, in PERSPECTIVES IN ETHOLOGY vol. 
13, at 1, (Francois Tonneau & Nicholas S. Thompson eds., 2000). 
37 Catherine Delano Smith, Late Neolithic Settlement, Land-Use and Garigue in the 
Montpellier Region, France, 7 MAN 397, 404 (1972) (addressing forest clearance and 
vegetation degradation); Coralie M. Mills et al., Neolithic Land-Use and Environmental 
Degradation: A Study From the Western Isles of Scotland, 78 ANTIQUITY 886, 892–93 
(2003) (discussing stripping of turf for shelter insulation and removal of peat for fuel). 
38 Brian Hayden, Research and Development in the Stone Age: Technological 
Transitions Among Hunter-Gatherers, 22 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 519, 520 (1981). 
This cultural instability meant that larger, more organized and cooperative societies could 
not yet arise. 
39 The ecosystems that were not yet affected by human use built the planet’s biomass 
(vegetation and wildlife) and abiotic resources (soil and water) that supported the 
sustainability of human life. See generally Norman L. Christensen et al., The Report of the 
Ecological Society of America Committee on the Scientific Basis for Ecosystem 
Management, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 665 (1996). 
40 Hayden, supra note 38, at 527, 542. 
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organization necessary to create stable, complex social institutions 
with relatively minor, dispersed environmental impacts.41 
At the end of Era I, roughly 11,500 years ago, the climate became 
much less variable, permitting agricultural subsistence systems to 
emerge over a large fraction of the earth’s surface.42 This marks a 
major transition point in human social evolution. The formation of 
institutions had previously been impossible because of dramatically 
changing climate conditions. With climate stability came resource 
reliability, domestication, and agriculture, as well as human 
cooperation, coordination, and division of labor.43 The greater 
efficiency of agriculture also meant that agricultural populations 
competed with, and eventually overwhelmed, hunter-gatherer 
populations. 
As agriculture and plant-intensive resource strategies became 
dominant in all but the most marginal environments, human 
population densities rose and more complex social organizations 
developed.44 Because resources needed for survival seemed plentiful, 
these communities tolerated, for the first time in human experience, 
status competition, wealth control, and social ranking.45 Humans no 
longer lived in small, atomized egalitarian groups where resources 
were shared. Instead, new social institutions evolved, and resources 
for the most part were allocated by barter and trade, and commodity 
money, which reflects value inherent in the good itself.46 
The human relationship to resources during Era I can be 
understood by reference to individual decision theory. A fundamental 
principle of economics is that individuals maximize their own 
welfare. With the assumption that individuals were rational decision 
makers who chose actions regarding resources with the aim of 
furthering individual interests, the limited resources during Era I 
meant that individual decisions revolved around basic human  
41 See Peter J. Richerson & Robert Boyd, Institutional Evolution in the Holocene: The 
Rise of Complex Societies, in THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS 197, 197–204 
(W.G. Runciman ed., 2000), available at http://www.des.ucdavis.edu/faculty/Richerson /evolutioninstitutions.pdf. 
42 BRUCE D. SMITH, THE EMERGENCE OF AGRICULTURE 19–20 (1995). 
43 See generally Weiss, supra note 15, at 75; Richerson & Boyd, supra note 41, at 197; 
Hayden, supra note 38, at 523, 530. 
44 See generally RICHARD MANNING, AGAINST THE GRAIN: HOW AGRICULTURE HAS 
HIJACKED CIVILIZATION (2004). 
45 PETER A. CORNING, THE SYNERGISM HYPOTHESIS: A THEORY OF PROGRESSIVE 
EVOLUTION (1983). See generally MANNING, supra note 44. 
46 Zobler, supra note 22, at 191; Richerson & Boyd, supra note 41, at 202. 
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survival.47 The crux of most Era I decisions was that an individual 
chose only one action toward a resource—for example, to plant crop 
A or crop B, to harvest now or delay until later, or to completely 
deforest the land or halt timber cutting. The choice had to be made in 
light of the consequences of alternatives and the chances of these 
consequences occurring. Typically, Era I humans did not need to take 
into account the actions of other humans. Over time, humans could 
successfully predict the likely immediate outcomes that would play 
out when decisions were made to use and exploit resources.48 
During the Age of Survival, early humans had little understanding 
and limited control over nature’s production processes. There existed 
a huge stock of relatively untouched natural resources, but humans 
still lacked the skills to tap the use potential of these resources. The 
discount rate was very high—humans were necessarily more 
concerned about their survival in the moment, rather than maintaining 
resources for future use. With a seemingly endless supply of 
resources, forests were burned to increase grazing areas,49 turf was 
stripped to remove peat,50 and soils were exhausted, degrading the 
natural nutrients of the soil system.51 There were no laws or legal 
institutions to regulate these resource use decisions, or their impact on 
future uses.52 But a new organizing institution, the market, was slowly 
beginning to emerge.53 
In Era I, bartering was a common means for transactions to occur, 
but other basic market transactions also evolved, including the 
recording and repayment of debts through various forms of 
accounting, commodity money, and fiat money such as shells and 
beads.54 The market eventually became the chief mechanism 
influencing the resource use decisions of growing numbers of people 
who formed egalitarian communities, and who enjoyed the returns 
that followed from agricultural subsistence. These populations, with  
47 See MICHAEL D. RESNIK, CHOICES: AN INTRODUCTION TO DECISION THEORY 4 
(1987); J. MORGAN JONES, INTRODUCTION TO DECISION THEORY 2, 5 (1977). 
48 See generally DAVID RINDOS, THE ORIGINS OF AGRICULTURE: AN EVOLUTIONARY 
PERSPECTIVE (1984). 
49 Hayden, supra note 38, at 519. 
50 Mills, et al., supra note 37, at 893, 894. 
51 Kooijmans, supra note 14, at 73. 
52 See MARSHALL SAHLINS, STONE AGE ECONOMICS 1–39 (1972). 
53 See generally SMITH, supra note 21. 
54 See generally Rafael Gasson, Quiripas and Mostacillas: The Evolution of Shell 
Beads as a Medium of Exchange in Northern South America, 47 ETHNOHISTORY 581, 
(Summer-Fall 2000). 
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their agriculture and their complex, market-based social 
organizations, increasingly settled many parts of the world, 
overwhelming native populations with less efficient subsistence and 
less complex social institutions. A new era arose, lasting thousands of 
years—the Age of the Market. 
III 
ERA II—THE AGE OF THE MARKET55 
As humans gradually organized themselves into increasingly 
complex social systems, they realized that interconnection among 
other humans often led to a status that was superior to what resulted 
when they remained isolated from each other. Although international 
trade was known to exist for thousands of years, as time progressed 
and human population centers began to build, exchange and 
transactions between individuals became more common. The 
institution that seemed to best reflect these interchanges was the 
classic free market associated with Adam Smith.56 
Societies, especially after 1000 AD, were characterized by extreme 
decentralized governments compared to previous eras, and they 
formed the foundation of today’s market system. Markets evolved 
from predominant bartering and commodity money to formalized 
monetary systems. Price discovery processes enabled more 
exchanges, trades, and agreements among resource users. When 
buyers and sellers receive more information on the scarcity of the 
good, its relative value to society, and the prices that the other side of 
the market is willing to pay (or accept), more transactions may occur. 
Perhaps most important, these transactions can take place without the 
intervention of government or a third-party negotiator.57 In Era II, 
natural resources seemed limitless, and technological advances 
improved access to these resources. Use of this abundant resource 
base helped bring about the rise of Western European nations as  
55 We characterize the Age of the Market as the time period between ancient times, 
roughly the second century BC, through the early modern times of the late 1700s. This is 
the period of time in world history before property laws became dominant, where goods 
were exchanged among resource actors, and contract law was the primary legal 
mechanism for ensuring that bargains, exchanges, and deals could be credible. 
56 SMITH, supra note 21; see Arun Agrawal, Common Resources and Institutional 
Sustainability, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS 41, 42 (Elinor Ostrom et al., Committee 
on the Human Dimensions of Global Change eds., 2002). 
57 See generally RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW 15 (1988); 
ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 
(1991). 
  
318 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 303 
global economic powers. These nations dominated the planet’s 
economy between 1500 AD and the Industrial Revolution two and a 
half centuries later.58 
As resource users consumed vast quantities of raw materials, they 
found that they increasingly had to compete among themselves to 
secure the riches of the world’s resource base. Era I decisions 
involved humans seeking resources, while Era II decisions involved 
humans competing with other humans for resources. This shift 
brought about an important behavioral change, both economically and 
legally. With the advent of markets, individual decisions about 
resources were slowly replaced with group decisions.59 Individual 
resource users realized that they could form groups for mutual 
benefit. The expectation was that by working together, they might be 
able to improve their results overall and the payoffs to the members of 
the group.60 These kinds of interactive decisions among resource 
users are understood in light of one branch of game theory—
cooperative games.61 
During Era II, potential resource users had a choice—appropriate 
the resource as an individual, or cooperate with other potential users, 
so that the group of individual users would arrive at a better resource 
allocation. Appropriation was redistributive; one user benefitted at the 
expense of another. Cooperation assumed that individuals would 
accept and commit to offers or exchanges by other users that would 
make them better off than they would have been by individual action. 
However, for cooperative games to succeed, agreements and promises 
among resource users in a market had to be enforceable. Legal 
doctrine needed to arise in the form of contract law that enabled 
market players to have the capacity for credible commitment. 
Exchanges occurring over time involve more risk to both players, 
especially when the completion of the transaction depends on both 
parties promising to complete the exchange. Repetitious exchanges do 
not necessarily lead to cooperation or an optimal equilibrium because 
players may have incentives to cheat, particularly if a player knows  
58 See generally KENNETH POMERANZ, THE GREAT DIVERGENCE: EUROPE, CHINA, 
AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD ECONOMY (2000). 
59 See generally Roderick M. Kramer & Marilynn B. Brewer, Effects of Group Identity 
on Resource Use in a Simulated Commons Dilemma, 46 J. PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL 
PSYCHOL. 1044 (1984). 
60 ALLEN W. JOHNSON & TIMOTHY EARLE, THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN SOCIETIES: 
FROM FORAGING GROUPS TO AGRARIAN STATE (1987). 
61 VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, supra note 27, at 15. 
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that his opponent is not likely to cheat. For example, if one player 
makes an investment based on a second player’s promise to deliver 
goods in exchange, the promise maker may not feel compelled to 
complete the transaction after the investment is made. The investing 
player may therefore be better off not to invest because there is no 
consequence to the other player for simply appropriating that 
investment. Under these circumstances, a cautious player may not 
invest for fear of loss without a remedy. No market transaction will 
then occur. 
This normal form game scenario is reflected below in Figure A. 
This matrix summarizes the bargaining possibilities where there is no 
contract or enforceable agreement between players who have 
complete information about one another’s payoffs and how the game 
is played.62 By receiving the investment, Player 2 possesses the 
dominant strategy63 because that player acquires the investor’s money 
in exchange for a mere promise of delivery at a later date, which is 
referred to as a “deferred exchange.” Because the exchange is 
deferred, the dominant strategy for Player 2 is to appropriate the 
investment and not to deliver to the investing player, Player 1. In 
other words, Player 2 profits from not delivering on a promise. 
Therefore, in the absence of a cooperative and enforceable agreement, 
Player 1 will not invest, and will not enter into the arrangement 
knowing that it is credible and likely for the other player to 
appropriate the investment. However, if Player 1 does not invest, 
neither player can benefit. In this case, both players will receive a 
payoff of zero. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
62 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 197–98 (4th ed. 2004). 
63 Dominant strategies provide the highest payoff compared to any other strategies for 
any other players. PHILIP D. STRAFFIN, GAME THEORY AND STRATEGY 3–31 (6th prtg. 
2006). 
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Note that the number in each box on the left is Player 1’s payoff; 
the number on the right is Player 2’s payoff. The box containing the 
solution is highlighted. 
Figure A illustrates that both players will reach the optimal result 
only when they cooperate. If both players cooperate, then each will 
receive a payoff of 0.5 (top left box) because both actors will split the 
profits (1.0/2=0.5). If Player 2 defects and takes payment but does not 
deliver goods, then the payoff is 1.0, while Player 1 loses the entire 
investment (top right box). Since Player 1, the investor, is aware of 
Player 2’s dominant strategy, a higher payoff for defection, Player 1 
will decline to enter into an agreement. Neither gain from this activity 
and each receive a payoff of zero because there is no transaction. 
The addition of an enforceable agreement changes the payoffs and 
benefits for both players. Only if the cautious investor can be assured 
that the other player will perform will that investor initiate the 
transaction. An enforceable contract ensures a remedy if Player 2 
appropriates and keeps the goods. Because Player 1 is assured 
compensatory payment if Player 2 defeats and appropriates, both will 
cooperate and divide the payoffs evenly. Cooperation thereby 
produces productivity: When both parties cooperate with each other, 
then they share in the transaction and both benefit. The enforceable 
contract transforms a game with a noncooperative solution into a 
game with a cooperative solution. 
Figure B highlights the outcomes for players when they enter into a 
binding contract. Players 1 and 2 will form a contract where there is 
complete information, and when Player 2 agrees to cooperate with 
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Player 1, in exchange for investment. When both cooperate, they each 
receive an equal payoff of 0.5 (top left box). In contrast to the 
scenario presented in Figure A, if Player 2 appropriates the 
investment, the agreement made between the parties is enforced and 
the investing player, Player 1, is awarded the contract payoff of 0.5. 
Player 2 then pays for the breach, making Player 2 worse off than 
simply fulfilling the contract. If Player 2 breaches, this will yield a 
payoff of -0.5 (top right box). Player 1, the investing player, now has 
the assurance needed to enter into a contract, and if Player 2 
appropriates the investment, then Player 1 receives a payoff of 0.5. 
The contract facilitates productivity and the players’ participation in a 
cooperative game. If neither player enters into a contract, the first 
player will not initiate the transaction and the payoffs remain zero for 
both players. The best solution is therefore to enter into a contract and 
engage in a productive transaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that the number in each box on the left is Player 1’s payoff; 
the number on the right is Player 2’s payoff. The box containing the 
solution is highlighted. 
A.  The Rise of the Market as an Organizing Institution 
In Era II, after the transition to agricultural societies, global 
economic development appeared to remain at a standstill for many 
centuries. This long period of little economic growth had two 
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causes—exceptionally modest population expansion and diminishing 
factors of production, such as natural resources. This time of stalled 
population growth, lasting until around 1000 AD, has been called the 
period of “Malthusian stagnation.”64 Some regions experienced a 
resource collapse stemming from human exploitation and eventual 
exhaustion of natural resource use potential, which concomitantly 
destroyed the natural systems that had enabled early human 
civilizations to arise.65 
Sometime after 1000 AD, expanded international trade, primarily 
by various Islamic states and the Sung Dynasty in China, ushered in a 
period of global population growth that lasted through the sixteenth 
century.66 With increased international trade, Western Europe, which 
had at best performed only a peripheral role in the initial emergence 
of the new world economy, slowly rose to become the dominant 
player of Era II global trade.67 There were two reasons why Western 
Europe was able to leap ahead of competing world economic 
powers—first, the discovery, acquisition, and use of cheap natural 
resources, and second, the formalization of an expanded international 
economy. 
Initially, demand rose for indigenous resources with high 
immediate utilitarian value, such as timber, wool, fish, grain, and 
minerals, which catered to a rising population. The discovery and use 
of coal as a cheaply available energy resource in eighteenth century 
Northwestern Europe also helps explain why Europe, and not China, 
was the epicenter of the industrial revolution and eventual world 
economic dominance.68 But it was the historical accident of the 
discovery of the New World, with its cornucopia of natural resources 
that permitted Western Europe to become the world’s central power 
by the end of Era II. The ability to tap new resources in the Americas  
64 Oded Galor & David N. Weil, From Malthusian Stagnation to Modern Growth, 89 
AM. ECON. REV. 150, 150–54 (1999). 
65 See, e.g., James A. Brander & M. Scott Taylor, The Simple Economics of Easter 
Island: A Ricardo-Malthus Model of Renewable Resource Use, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 119, 
121–22, 131–32 (1998) (describing the collapse of the Mayan civilization due to 
deforestation and soil erosion, the demise of the Mesopotamian civilizations due to soil 
salinization, and the decline of the Chaco Anasazi in the southwestern United States due to 
soil degradation). 
66 Richerson & Boyd, supra note 36, at 19. 
67 See generally Ronald Findlay, The Emergence of the World Economy, in 
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC ISSUES: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH WORLD 
CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS ASSOCIATION, TUNIS, at 82 (1998). 
68 See generally Pomeranz, supra note 58. 
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with high use potential allowed Western European states to thrive 
long after their own natural resources had been spent.69 
Europe had another enormous advantage. Throughout much of Era 
II there existed no uniform authority that could halt bourgeoning trade 
and commercial development taking place. As a result, decentralized, 
unsupervised markets arose, providing order and organization for the 
trades, exchanges, and transactions that were occurring, largely in 
natural resources.70 Gradually, most of the regimes of Europe adopted 
a market economy. They provided the market with protection, 
legitimation, and nonarbitrary laws such as the law of contract, so that 
market players could make enforceable bargains and agreements. The 
efficient use of money and other commercial tools were also a 
hallmark of Era II markets.71 The use of money replaced exchanges in 
a barter system, which lowered the considerable transaction costs 
involved in trade.72 
The dominant market system that emerged in Era II swiftly 
replaced Era I community, tribal, and cultural norms.73 Moreover, 
government regulation and centralized planning were not necessary 
for this economic system to function in an orderly way.74 Instead, 
individuals and groups were free to make their own choices about the 
production, use, distribution, and consumption of natural resources,  
69 Ronald Findlay, The Roots of Divergence: Western Economic History in 
Comparative Perspective, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 158, 158–61 (1992); Guido di Tella, 
Economics of the Frontier, in ECONOMICS IN THE LONG VIEW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF 
W.W. ROSTOW 210–27 (W.W. Rostow, Charles Poor Kingleberger & Guido di Tella eds., 
1982). 
70 PAUL KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREAT POWERS: ECONOMIC CHANGE 
AND MILITARY CONFLICT FROM 1500–2000, at 20–21 (1988). 
71 DOUGLAS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN 
WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY 54–55 (1973). 
72 A person wishing to buy something in a barter system has to find someone who has 
the sought-after item and who wishes to convey it away, and who also wants something 
processed by the buyer. This is referred to as a “double coincidence of wants.” Sreekala 
Kochugovindan & Nicolaas J. Vriend, Is the Study of Complex Adaptive Systems Going to 
Solve the Mystery of Adam Smith’s “Invisible Hand”? 3 IND. REV. 53, 53–66 (1998). A 
search for that exact combination is not only costly, it will prevent many beneficial 
exchanges from occurring at all. The use of money, by contrast, facilitates the drawing up 
of contracts, and reduces the quantity of goods that need to be held for purposes of 
exchange. 
73 See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND 
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2001). 
74 When Era II cultures attempted to manage resources through central planning, the 
result too often was cultural and resource collapse. Vernon L. Scarborough, Resilience, 
Resource Use, and Socioeconomic Organization, in ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND THE 
ARCHAEOLOGY OF HUMAN RESPONSE, supra note 15, at 195, 205. 
  
324 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 303 
where economic decisions were made by buyers and sellers of goods 
and services. In such a competitive system, production tended to flow 
toward what societies valued most, which was resource use and 
development.75 This drive to use resources occurred either when 
individuals acted alone, or when they discovered the synergistic 
potential of cooperation, coordination, and division of labor. Natural 
resources were exploited because entrepreneurs and other market 
participants sought to maximize profits, wealth, and individual 
welfare in the short run, often at an unsustainable rate for the long 
run.76 
Basic economic theory dictates that private landowners have an 
incentive to use resources at a rate that will allow them future use.77 
However, during Era II, market failures contributed to resource 
depletion. Imperfect information resulting from gaps in scientific 
knowledge and awareness of resource regeneration rates led to 
suboptimal resource use, and in some cases, species extinction.78 
Price information must be allowed to clearly communicate scarcity, 
so that rational actors can adjust their consumption accordingly. 
Dispersed populations did not always facilitate the adequate 
transfer of price information. Another market failure, open access—
also known as the commons problem—reflected the fact that most 
resources were not owned by any one person (res nullius), and were 
therefore subject to capture and use by those who somehow were able 
to seize control of natural goods.79 Open access leads to inadequate 
resource allocation because there are diminishing marginal returns to 
each individual who subsequently uses the resource. Individuals have 
incentive to use more of a resource than what may be desirable for the 
 
75 Richerson & Boyd, supra note 41, at 18; Tom Tietenberg, The Tradable Permits 
Approach to Protecting the Commons: What Have We Learned, in THE DRAMA OF THE 
COMMONS, supra note 56, at 197, 200; Zobler, supra note 22, at 192. 
76 Alan M. Taylor & Jeffrey G. Williamson, Capital Flows to the New World as an 
Intergenerational Transfer, 102 J. POL. ECON. 348, 348–49 (1994). 
77 See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (2d ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998). 
78 The hunting of whales nearly into extinction for the use of whale oil for energy is one 
such example of resource overuse. Ugo Bardi, Prices and Production over a Complete 
Hubbert Cycle: The Case of the American Whale Fisheries in the 19th Century, ENERGY 
BULL. (Nov. 24, 2004), http://www.energybulletin.net/node/3338. 
79 See Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 178 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Carol M. Rose, Possession 
as the Origin of Property, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73–74 (1985). 
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greater good.80 Resource overuse results when individuals cannot be 
excluded from using a resource. In other words, the resource is 
rivalrous, meaning no one can be excluded from using the resource, 
but there is competition for the resource itself. Examples of open 
access, or commons, prevalent during Era II included grazing 
livestock, harvesting timber, and catching fish. Such open access 
problems can be corrected by predictable and transferable property 
rights for all relevant commodities in the market place.81 Throughout 
Era II, property rights in natural resources were non-existent or ill-
defined.82 
B.  The Theory of Games: 
Cooperative Games in the Age of the Market 
When trying to capture the dynamics of a time when individuals by 
and large seemed to rely on the marketplace as an organizing 
institution for their resource choices, it is important to articulate the 
assumptions that must be made to understand market behavior and the 
rationale for the persistence of market failures. Under a classic Adam 
Smith Wealth of Nations market model, individuals make calculations 
based on the assumption that all agents behave rationally. The market 
model then presumes that if “societal” rules do not interfere with such 
individual actions, the so-called “invisible hand” will promote the 
larger interests of the individual’s society and the amount of a good 
consumed will be efficiently allocated for the future.83 
However, if everyone in a relevant market does what is best for the 
individual, they might wind up with the worst result from their 
collective viewpoint. This is the lesson from the standard “prisoner’s 
dilemma game,” where self-interest and an inability to coordinate 
behavior or enforce prior agreements yields an outcome for each 
prisoner that is inferior compared to a strategy of mutual 
cooperation.84 In a similar fashion, during Era II, it became  
80 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968); Shi-Ling 
Hsu, What is a Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the Campaign Spending 
Problem, 69 ALB. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005). 
81 Myerson, supra note 32, at 1080; Dixit & Nalebuff, supra note 31, at 223–25. 
82 See generally Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33 
J.L. & ECON. 177, (1990). 
83 SMITH, supra note 21, at 292 (“And he is in this led by an invisible hand to promote 
an end which was no part of his intention. By pursuing his own interest, he frequently 
promotes that of the society . . . .”). 
84 In the familiar prisoner’s dilemma game, there are two prisoners and each is 
informed that the prisoner will receive a modest sentence if neither prisoner informs on the 
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increasingly apparent that the outcome for any individual actor 
depended not only on that actor’s own rational and self-interested 
actions, but also on the independent actions of others. Simply put, 
individuals maximize their own welfare, given the predicted behavior 
of other players.85 Since game theory concerns the rational behavior 
of decision makers or players86 whose decisions affect one another, it 
has been suggested that “interactive decision theory” might be a more 
descriptive name for the dynamic that became prominent in Era II—
individuals dealing with other individuals with an interest in 
resources. This multi-party dynamic contrasts with Era I, where 
individuals usually made non-interactive—that is, unilateral—
decisions about resources.87 
Era II players had choices when confronting other players 
interested in using resources. A player attempting to maximize self-
interest could independently compete for the resource to achieve 
individual control. Or, when there was more than one player coveting 
a resource, players could coordinate their strategies and form 
coalitions. Players choosing cooperation over appropriation were, in 
effect, deciding that the outcome of cooperation would yield more 
than acting alone.88 By contrast, acting alone in order to appropriate  
other; that the prisoner will be let free if that prisoner alone informs on the other prisoner, 
while the other prisoner will get a maximum sentence; and that both will receive a 
significant sentence short of the maximum if both inform on the other. Behaving rationally 
and selfishly, each will become an informant because, regardless of what the other 
prisoner does, each can reduce their sentence by being an informant. But, the potential 
superior outcome is that both remain silent, and thus both receive modest sentences. This 
outcome is not possible because the two prisoners cannot coordinate their behavior. This 
game was first defined by Merrill Meeks Flood and Melvin Dresher as part of a 100-trial 
game experiment at RAND Laboratories. MERILL. M. FLOOD, A PREFERENCE 
EXPERIMENT (SERIES 2, TRIALS 2, 3, 4) (1952). In the 1950s, mathematician Albert 
Tucker coined the game “prisoner’s dilemma,” a name by which it is known today. T. 
Kippenberger, The Prisoner’s Dilemma, 2 THE ANTIDOTE 8, 8–11 (1997). 
85 Baird et al., supra note 19, at 11. Game theory is the general analytical framework 
for doing rational choice analysis without the traditional market structures of goods and 
prices. A rational player in a game will choose an outcome that that player prefers, given 
what that player expects the other players in the game to do. Myerson, supra note 32, at 
1068. 
86 The decision theory model assumes that individuals are rational decision makers who 
make decisions with the aim of furthering individual interests. See RESNIK, supra note 47, 
at 5 and accompanying text. 
87 Robert Aumann, Game Theory, in VOLUME 3, THE NEW PALGRAVE 529 (Steven N. 
Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds. 2008). 
88 A cooperative game is akin to a branch of decision theory that focuses on individuals 
making group decisions. With a group decision, an effort is made to not simply reflect 
what an individual does in a game to further that individual’s own goals; but also to 
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the resource for just one player was redistributive—the player who 
acquired the resource was benefitted at the expense of competing 
players. Throughout Era II, and up to the present time, players for 
resources sometimes collaborated, cooperated, and made agreements 
with others out of self-interest.89 When they did so, they were 
engaged in what game theoreticians call a “cooperative” game.90 
Many Era II interactions can be characterized as cooperative games 
because first, the players were able to make credible agreements. 
Second, the cooperating players arranged themselves according to the 
amount of value each placed on a particular strategy. Third, stable 
resource use groups arose because the players realized that they 
would not do better by defecting to individual strategies.91 
Such cooperative games required the players to make commitments 
to carry out particular strategies. Any commitment made in a 
cooperative game needed to be considered credible—that is, binding 
and enforceable—to the other players in the game. Credible 
agreements can be made if strong social norms were in place to urge 
players to keep their promises.92 The invention of contracts, 
enforceable by a third party, such as a court, helped the participants in 
 
develop a policy that is applicable to all the participants. RESNIK, supra note 47, at 5 
(“Unfortunately, it is frequently difficult to tell . . . when several individuals are choosing, 
whether they are involved in a [cooperative] game or in a group decision.”). 
89 See Peter J. Richerson, Robert Boyd & Brian Paciotti, An Evolutionary Theory of 
Commons Management, in THE DRAMA OF THE COMMONS, supra note 56, at 403, 404–
06; ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 27, 174–75 (6th ed. updated 
1992) (discussing Francis Edgeworth’s realization in the nineteenth century that people did 
not always behave according to market theory—in a purely independent competitive 
fashion—but instead formed groups that made agreements among their members). For a 
modern example of resource users entering into a cooperative game, see Sandra Zellmer, 
The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and Its Implications for Collaborative Water Management, 
8 NEV. L.J. 994 (2008). 
90 CONTRIBUTION TO THE THEORY OF GAMES 13–42 (R.D. Luce & A.W. Tucker eds., 
1959) (providing a translation of John von Neumann’s introduction to cooperative games). 
91 See generally Theodore L. Turocy & Bernhard von Stengel, Game Theory, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INFORMATION SYSTEMS (2002); VON NEUMANN & MORGENSTERN, 
supra note 27. During Era II, cooperative games were perhaps best reflected by the 
amount of trade in natural resources that emerged. Before trading could occur, participants 
in the trade needed to cooperate as part of the transaction. See generally Ronald Findlay, 
The Terms of Trade and Equilibrium Growth in the World Economy, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 
291 (1980); CARLO CIPOLLA, BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: EUROPEAN 
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY 1000–1700 (1976). 
92 LEE BOLDEMAN, THE CULT OF THE MARKET: ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALISM AND 
ITS DISCONTENTS, 245–68 (Austl. Nat’l Univ. Press 2007); ALAN WATSON, ROMAN LAW 
AND COMPARATIVE LAW 127–28 (1991). 
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a cooperative game to make truly credible commitments to 
cooperative strategies. 93 
Games in which the participants can make credible, enforceable 
agreements can yield a “cooperative solution,” where the outcome of 
the game is best for all of the players who participate in the game. For 
an individual player, the agreement with the other players should not 
place that player in a position inferior to the position the player would 
be in absent the agreement. For the group, the agreement should 
maximize the total possible utility produced by the agreement.94 In 
other words, the outcome of the agreement should represent some 
Pareto optimal condition in which no party can be made better off 
without adversely affecting another party.95 
We illustrate how a cooperative game can be used to overcome an 
open access market failure when two users access a resource for the 
same purpose.96 In this game, two shepherds each have a flock of 
sheep that graze on an unowned open access pasture. Each shepherd 
grazes sheep as often as possible and increases the size of the flock as 
frequently as possible. Initially, the two shepherds incur no additional 
cost for each sheep added to the flock, so both have an incentive to 
increase their respective flocks in order to increase their profits. The 
shepherds are not concerned about the other’s flock until the total 
number of sheep grazing exceeds the feeding capacity of the pasture. 
Once the pasture is overgrazed, each sheep gains less weight because 
less feed is available, making the sheep less valuable at market. 
Both shepherds eventually realize that the additional sheep reduced 
the grass available for the sheep each already owns. To improve the 
value of their flocks, the shepherds will realize that the number of 
sheep has to decrease. However, since neither shepherd has the right 
to exclude the other from the pasture, one shepherd is unlikely to 
reduce flock numbers unless the other shepherd does the same. They  
93 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 198 (4th ed. 2004) (“The 
first purpose of contract law is to enable people to cooperate by converting games with 
noncooperative solutions into games with cooperative solutions.”) (emphasis omitted). 
94 JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS AND THE LAW 102–03 (1988); STEVEN 
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 293 (2004). 
95 Different negotiated agreements in a cooperative game may achieve a Pareto optimal 
result and maximize the total possible utility between the players, but distribute different 
amounts of gain among them. There is likely no one preferred negotiated distributional 
outcome between bargaining players achieving Pareto optimality in a cooperative game. 1 
BRIAN BARRY, A TREATISE IN SOCIAL JUSTICE: THEORIES OF JUSTICE 33–41 (1989). 
96 See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, Institutions Matter! Why the Herder 
Problem Is Not a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 69 THEORY & DECISION 219, 224–29 (2010). 
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will therefore agree to a maximum number of sheep in each flock that 
will not deplete the pasture grass. There may be temptation to breach 
the agreement between the shepherds. However, neither should 
breach if both shepherds communicate and each knows if the other 
breaches. In other words, if both shepherds have complete 
information, there should be no breach because user defection by both 
parties destroys the pasture, which is the resource each user needs to 
raise marketable sheep and to maintain livelihood. Since each realizes 
that the breach of one will bring about the breach of the other, leading 
to an overgrazed pasture, each shepherd’s payoff will remain highest 
if neither breaches the agreement to limit the number of grazing 
sheep. 
Figure C illustrates this cooperative game. If both users share the 
resource, both will benefit by receiving payoffs equal to 100. When 
one defects at the expense of the other, the defecting user gains more 
than a fair share, 110, while the non-defecting user loses, receiving -1, 
because the defecting user’s sheep will eventually reduce the value of 
the herd of the non-defecting user, driving the herder from the 
pasture. When both defect, neither user profits because overuse 
destroys the resource. Such mutual defection results in a payoff of 
zero for both players. When both users cooperate according to the 
agreement, both receive the highest possible payoff; when neither 
cooperates the ultimate payoff is zero. Although the equilibrium value 
is for both shepherds to defect, the Pareto optimal solution is 
cooperation. A Pareto optimal solution is also likely because this 
game, often described as the Herders’ Problem, can be iterative and 
take place over multiple time periods. The iterative nature allows 
herders to communicate and reach this solution.97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
97 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS 
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 58–102 (1990). 
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Note that the first shepherd’s payoff is listed on the left of each 
box, while the second shepherd’s payoff is listed on the right of each 
box. The box containing the Pareto optimal solution is highlighted. 
The other common resource situation during Era II occurred when 
users had an interest in utilizing a resource for differing purposes. 
Similar to the game above, the users can cooperate and agree to share 
the resource, defect on the agreement and try to get more of the 
resource than the other user, or refuse to cooperate and try to use as 
much of the resource as possible, leading to the resource’s 
destruction. Of the possible solutions to the problem, the users are 
better off if they choose to cooperate and share the land between 
them. When the users keep this agreement, Pareto optimality can be 
achieved and the users attain the highest collective payoff. 
In this game, there is one parcel of unowned land. One user would 
like to graze livestock, while the other would like to grow wheat. One 
cannot graze livestock where the other is growing wheat. Both users 
want to maximize their production from the parcel of land in order to 
increase profit, and each user would therefore like to use the whole 
parcel of land. If one postpones using the resource for a season, the 
other user will use the unowned land for personal economic gain. 
Conflict between the two users arises when both express the desire to 
exploit the land resource for different purposes—grazing and wheat 
growing. Both users have an incentive not to cooperate with each 
other. Each user wants to take as much of the open land as fast as 
possible to maximize profit from either growing wheat or grazing. 
However, since neither user can exclude the other from the land, they 
may decide to share it. Both will then have the certainty of some 
profit at market. 
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Alternatively, with no agreement to cooperate, the users risk 
reducing the land’s productivity by simultaneously overgrazing on the 
wheat fields and destroying grazing land to grow wheat. Since the 
payoff for cooperation is better than the payoff for mutual defection, 
the users cooperate. Mutual defection destroys the land for both users, 
so by cooperating the users accomplish the best outcome. 
In Figure D, cooperation among the wheat grower and the livestock 
producer yields a Pareto optimal outcome (100 and 100). If one 
defects and tries to use more resource than the agreed amount, one 
user will then lose and the other will gain, but the payoff is not 
optimal (110 for the one defecting, and -1 for the one abiding by the 
agreement, since the defecting user destroys the non-defecting user’s 
share of the land). Since one player’s overuse is the other’s loss, when 
both overuse, neither attains any payoff because the resource becomes 
depleted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that the number in each box on the left is the wheat grower’s 
payoff; the number on the right is the livestock producer’s payoff. 
The noncooperative solution is highlighted. 
C.  The Problem of Open Access and the Law of the Rush 
Although cooperative games in the Age of the Market were an 
efficient way for resource players to allocate land and stock 
commodities among competing users, there were serious impediments 
that prevented such games from becoming the dominant structure of 
allocation. Cooperative games form spontaneously through ad hoc 
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contracting where parties renegotiate inefficient entitlements to 
achieve an optimally efficient allocation.98 Such collective action is 
more likely when the property rights are clearly defined, when the 
number of parties is small, when the parties have similar expectations 
regarding the net gains of agreement, when there is little uncertainty 
regarding the size and distribution of costs and benefits, and when the 
aggregate gains of taking action are large relative to the costs.99 This 
is often referred to as a “Coasian bargain.”100 Perhaps even more 
important, the sought-after common resource was likely to be of high 
value, subject not only to contract law, but also to a system of 
predictable property rights, whether informal or formal, group or 
individual.101 
During the Age of the Market, resources were often commodities 
such as forage and grasslands that were part of open access or 
common pool regimes.102 When there is a lack of clear property rights 
to resources, open access tends to prevail. In such a situation, resource 
users do not bear the full costs of their actions, aggregate short-term 
production and use levels are too high, and competing users inflict 
costs on one another with externalities.103 Cooperation gives way to a 
competitive rush to exploit the resource, before another user gets 
there and uses it first. As group size grows, transaction, information, 
and compliance and enforcement costs rise, and resource users find 
that they cannot negotiate with each other to constrain wasteful 
behavior. In “tragedy of the commons” settings, there are few price 
signals to reveal opportunity costs, and free riding and other forms of 
strategic behavior that prevent efficient bargains become common.104 
It is one striking characteristic of open access—the inability of any  
98 See generally Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 
(1960). 
99 Id. 
100 These conditions characterize successful negotiating efforts among relatively 
homogeneous small groups. Elinor Ostrom, Self-Governance of Common-Pool Resources, 
in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, at 424–32 (Peter 
Newman ed., 1998). 
101 Steven N. S. Cheung, The Structure of a Contract and the Theory of a Non-
Exclusive Resource, 13 J.L. & ECON. 49, 52–54 (1970). 
102 S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard C. Bishop, “Common Property” as a concept in 
Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713, 718–19 (1975). 
103 Hsu, supra note 80, at 77. 
104 Hardin, supra note 80, at 1244–46; Amitai Aviram, A Paradox of Spontaneous 
Formation: The Evolution of Private Legal Systems, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 10 
(2004). 
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user (or group of users) to enforce their management decisions against 
any other user—that prevents conservation of the resource for future 
use.105 
During Era II, when property rights to natural resources were 
unformed or incomplete, there often was a race to capture previously 
unclaimed land and resources.106 Moreover, when many individuals 
are competing to establish some kind of possessory use interest in a 
natural resource, these individuals typically incur high costs in 
claiming and securing their possessory rights. Distracted by the need 
first to capture land and resources, and then to enforce boundaries, 
Era II resource players likely often failed to consider the advantage of 
cooperation and coordination as an alternative to the “law of the 
rush.” Resource quality problems associated with the resulting 
resource overuse—e.g., declining productivity of an estuary, 
increased soil erosion due to unchecked grazing practices, or damage 
to public goods such as watershed quality—were also prominent.107 
As a consequence, Era II was a time when natural resource 
entrepreneurs both consumed vast quantities of stock natural 
resources and accelerated consumption rates of renewable 
resources.108 So great was the alteration of the natural world during 
this time that some have recommended that we speak of a “second 
nature” that occurred at the end of Era II: a time when the interactions 
of humans with the natural environment were so profoundly 
anthropogenic that the pristine nature of our collective imagination 
was forever transformed.109 For example, deforestation was rampant 
during Era II, in part because of a growing need for agricultural land 
 
105 JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES 7 (1956); Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 
102, at 718–19; DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION AND PROPERTY 6 (2002). 
106 Poorly defined property rights, as existed during Era II, are classically viewed as a 
contributing factor to open access resources. See, e.g., James A. Brander & M. Scott 
Taylor, International Trade and Open-Access Renewable Resources: The Small Open 
Economy Case, 30 CAN. J. ECON. 526, 529 (1997). 
107 C.C. Gibson & C.D. Becker, A Lack of Institutional Demand: Why a Strong Local 
Economy in Western Ecuador Fails to Protect its Forest, in PEOPLE AND FORESTS: 
COMMUNITIES, INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE, 135–61 (Clark C. Gibson et al. eds., 
2000). 
108 Zobler, supra note 22, at 192. 
109 See generally Alan L. Kolata, Environmental Thresholds and the “Natural History” 
of an Andean Civilization, in ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF 
HUMAN RESPONSE, supra note 15, at 163. 
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and timber for fuel and building.110 Equally, there was regional 
depletion of essential natural resources—such as minerals, arable 
land, and fresh water—which caused out-migration and the collapse 
of established civilizations.111 
It increasingly became apparent that there was a need to update 
rules and applicable laws in order to adapt to changing needs and 
expectations for natural resources. The law of contract had limited 
benefit for increasing social coordination in this respect. Gradually, 
resource overuse and depletion by growing populations unable to 
solve the effects of open access conditions by cooperative games 
alone led to an endogenous process of property rights 
establishment.112 
Where people lived and worked together and shared a sense of 
identity and belonging, and where they shared some level of 
dependence on a natural resource, collective action was possible and 
common property regimes initially arose.113 As contrasted with non-
property or open access situations, where a resource initially has no 
owner and no one has a right to exclude anyone else, common 
property refers to collective ownership arrangements. With common 
property, the owners cannot exclude each other from the commons 
but can exclude outsiders. 
Eventually, as new market actors gained access to resources, 
including common pool resources, they began to seek to privatize 
such resources to ensure the value of their claims.114 By the end of Era 
II, the privatization of the commons and the conversion of resources 
into valuable saleable commodities was becoming the norm. A new 
body of law developed to protect such individual resource claims—
the law of private property. Individuals with private property held 
rights to use, to dispose, and to exclude others from the resource.  
110 Mark G. Macklin, Clive Bonsall, Fay M. Davies & Mark Robinson, Human-
Environment Interactions During the Holocene: New Data and Interpretations from the 
Oban Area, Argyll, Scotland, HOLOCENE, Jan. 2000, at 118–19 (2000), available at 
http://hol.sagepub.com/content/10/1/109.full.pdf. 
111 Linda Cordell, Aftermath of Chaos in the Pueblo Southwest, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISASTER AND THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF HUMAN RESPONSE, supra note 15, at 179, 189. 
112 See generally Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Race for Property Rights, 33 
J.L. & ECON. 177 (1990). 
113 See Michael Taylor & Sarah Singleton, Common Property, Collective Action and 
Community, 4 J. THEORETICAL POL. 309 (1992); OSTROM, supra note 97, at 68–98. 
114 See generally William Ascher & Robert Healy, NATURAL RESOURCE POLICY 
MAKING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH, AND INCOME 
DISTRIBUTION (1990). 
  
2010] The Right of Nonuse 335 
With the advent of private property, the tragedy of the commons had 
been partially corrected, although this type of market failure 
continued within some groups. 
Era I was a time when there were, in effect, a series of one-person 
games, or games where a single player made decisions about survival 
in nature and the use of natural resources. Formal laws were largely 
nonexistent, and societal norms and customs guided behavior. 
Individual Era I decisions about resources could be analyzed using 
decision theory.115 In Era II, individuals continued their acquisitive 
relationship with natural resources, but their interactions increasingly 
involved other individuals engaged in making strategic decisions 
about resources. Sometimes arrangements between individuals 
interested in resources could be negotiated by contract and bargain, 
where the resulting agreement could be likened, in game theoretic 
terms, to a cooperative game.116 
Despite the fact that such games could yield a collectively optimal 
result, implementation problems drew Era II individuals away from 
the cooperation that would have, in the long run, served them best. 
With open access resources such as land, timber, minerals, fish, and 
wildlife, if the costs of cooperating with competing users were high117 
then rational self-interest encourages independent noncooperative 
behavior.118 The assumption becomes that any one user can do better 
either by not cooperating initially, or by defecting from a cooperative 
agreement. 119 When natural resources are overconsumed or exploited, 
the indirect and nonuse values are compromised.120  
115 See generally RESNIK, supra note 47. 
116 See NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 71, at 9 (“In one sense [Era II] may be defined as 
an arrangement of society based on contract, expressed or implied.”) (quoting C.W. 
PREVITE ORTON, THE SHORTER CAMBRIDGE MEDIEVAL HISTORY 418–19 (1952)). 
117 See OSTROM, supra note 100, at 424–32; Cheung, supra note 101, at 52–54. 
118 See H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The 
Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124, 128–35 (1954); Hardin, supra note 80, at 1244–47; Hsu, 
supra note 79, at 77. LEN FISHER, ROCK, PAPER, SCISSORS: GAME THEORY IN EVERYDAY 
LIFE 4–5 (2008). 
119 FISHER, supra note 118, at 4–5. 
120 For example, if the earth’s atmosphere is not polluted by anthropogenic greenhouse 
gases, the resulting indirect use value associated with an unpolluted atmosphere moderates 
temperatures, sea levels, precipitation patterns, glacial and sea ice melting, and so forth. 
Human use of that open access resource in the form of atmospheric emissions has likely 
adversely impaired the naturally occurring indirect uses of atmospheric gases. See Peter 
M. Vitousek, Harold A. Mooney, Jane Lubchenco & Jerry M. Melillo, Human Domination 
of Earth’s Ecosystems, 277 SCIENCE 494 (1997). However, our efforts to resolve this 
threat of climate change and global warming will be hampered by the same logic that 
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IV 
ERA III—THE AGE OF PROPERTY 
Competitive natural resource use, coupled with a rudimentary 
awareness of suboptimal consumption, ultimately led to a paradigm 
shift that ushered in a new era, Era III. This era witnessed the rise of 
legally protected ownership rights to the natural world and the 
emergence of the Age of Property. Although the idea of property in 
land and natural resources had been manifested in different European 
countries for centuries,121 the practice became firmly embedded as an 
integral part of successful economies, including the United States, by 
the nineteenth century.122 From the early nineteenth century through 
the middle of the twentieth century, the concept of a property right in 
a resource both moderated the effect of the open access tragedies 
experienced in Era II, and allowed the owner to fully exploit the use 
component of the resource now under the owner’s control.123 
During the Age of Property, there was no single, centralized 
decision maker. Instead, there were many asset owners and 
entrepreneurs who released the use potential of resources by 
exercising their individual use choices through the market. In such a 
system, legal rights needed to be assigned to market actors who could 
use the resources most productively, and the costs of transfers needed 
to be low enough to encourage exchanges that placed the resource in 
the hands of one who would optimize use. This result could occur 
only if there was an appropriate system of property rights.124 
Although the advent of property helped to stem the rush to exploit 
unowned open access resources, other laws and legal institutions  
encouraged resource overuse and noncooperation during Era II—polluting nations will 
logically believe there is little incentive to control their carbon emissions so long as other 
nations with access to the resource continue to pollute. See Geoffrey Lean, A World Dying, 
But Can We Unite to Save It? THE INDEPENDENT U.K., Nov. 18, 2007, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/a-world-dying-but-can-we-unite 
-to-save-it-400847.html. Even Garrett Hardin recognized that the absence of property 
rights can lead to pollution and the degradation of resource nonuse values. Hardin, supra 
note 80, at 1245. 
121 NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 71, at 19–24. 
122 David Feeny, The Development of Property Rights in Land: A Comparative Study, 
in TOWARD A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DEVELOPMENT: A RATIONAL CHOICE 
PERSPECTIVE 272 (Brain Barr et al. eds., 1988); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of 
Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347, 350–53 (1967). 
123 Zobler, supra note at 22, at 190. 
124 Ronald H. Coase, Nobel Prize Lecture: The Institutional Structure of Production 
(Dec. 9, 1991), NOBEL LECTURES, ECONOMICS 1991–1995 (T. Persson ed., 1997). 
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increased the discount rate, which in turn encouraged resource 
exploitation.125 As a result, resource development slowly intensified 
during Era III. The rate of exploitation was often greater than 
regeneration rates, and resource substitutes were often available, as 
was the case for substituting coal for wood as a source of energy.126 
While property rights could facilitate an efficient Coasian bargain, 
such rights were often not clearly defined for large resources such as 
watersheds or air space. As a result, resource use also created 
negative externalities for large groups, where users imposed costs 
upon a larger group that had a stake in the resource. For example, 
water pollution and soil erosion resulting from unsustainable 
agricultural practices or acid mine drainage often contaminated the 
indirect use and ecological qualities of water.127 Other resources were 
exploited because they were public goods incapable of being owned, 
such as the atmosphere, where individual firms could pollute the 
good’s indirect use and natural nonuse capacities.128 Some resources 
were prone to overuse because they were congestible goods, such as 
rangelands, capable of being shared at a low marginal cost until a 
certain congestion point was reached.129 The reality is, then, that the 
development of property in Era III did not bring about conservation of 
resources; resources were still used, and overused, despite the 
removal of most open access conditions. 
Another collateral consequence of property regimes is that 
conflicts emerged among competing classes of property interest. 
Resources became owned by individuals and groups subject to two 
basic property regimes: common property (res communes) refers to 
collective ownership situations, in which the owners of the resource 
cannot exclude each other but can exclude outsiders. Private property  
125 Hurst, supra note 105, at 7 (“[Nineteenth century Americans] had in common a deep 
faith in the social benefits to flow from a rapid increase in productivity; all shared an 
impatience to get on with the job by whatever means seemed functionally adapted to it, 
including the law.”) (footnote omitted). 
126 CAROL A. DAHL, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKETS: UNDERSTANDING PRICING, 
POLICY, AND PROFITS 16–37 (2004). 
127 See, e.g., PIERS BLAIKIE, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SOIL EROSION IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1986). The alarm over human impairment of nature’s nonuse 
benefits was raised much earlier, in Era III, in George Perkins Marsh, MAN AND NATURE: 
OR, PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY AS MODIFIED BY HUMAN ACTION (1864). 
128 DANIEL H. COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW & ECONOMICS 316 
(2005). 
129 See generally Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill, The Evolution of Property Rights: 
A Study of the American West, 18 J.L. & ECON. 163 (1975). 
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(res privatae), on the other hand, describes resources owned by 
individuals who can use, transfer, and exclude others.130 When these 
different regimes had an interest in the same resource, such as water 
or land in the New World, some system needed to arise to sort out 
relative priorities among them. 
A parallel property rights conflict occurred when private property 
interests were created. Private ownership of a resource meant that two 
classes of interests in a resource were necessarily created—owners 
who could exclude others from using the resource, and nonowners. 
Nonowners, in turn, were comprised of two groups. First, a nonowner 
could be one who might have wished to use the resource now 
controlled by the owner, for either a similar or different purpose, but 
as a nonowner was precluded by law from doing so. Second, a 
nonowner could be one who did not wish to directly use the resource, 
but who could receive indirect use benefits, such as clean water, from 
the owner’s property, but could not because of the owner’s use. Such 
a nonowner was harmed by the use, and would have benefitted from 
the owner’s nonuse. 
When owners and nonowners conflicted over the appropriate or 
preferred use or nonuse of resources, “resource popularity conflict” 
emerged.131 Such a conflict might arise if a resource was deemed 
valuable for uses similar to the owner’s, for uses different than the 
owner’s, or for being not used at all. A system needed to be created to 
permit owners and nonowners to work through their different—and 
sometimes clashing—interests in land and resources. 
In the Age of the Market, resource players were sometimes able to 
make enforceable agreements with other players, resulting in a 
cooperative game. If the transaction costs were sufficiently low to 
permit a cooperative game, then players could as a group fully 
commit themselves to specific resource use strategies. In contrast, in 
the Age of Property, holders of legally protected property interests in 
land and resources usually had no need to make a collective  
130 DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 31 (1991). 
131 See Jan G. Laitos & Rachael Gamble, The Problem With Wilderness, 32 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 503, 506, 527–31 (2008) (explaining that a resource popularity conflict 
exists when there is more than one group that wishes to use an area, the groups wish to use 
it—or not use it—in different and incompatible ways, and applicable law permits one 
group of users but excludes others); see, e.g., PAUL GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND 
LAW DEVELOPMENT 466–68 (1968) (discussing conflicts between stockmen who acquired 
a property right in rangelands for their cattle and settlers who wanted to use that same land 
to homestead and farm). 
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commitment to some resource strategy. The process of making 
resource use or nonuse choices was relatively simple for those with a 
private property interest—the choices were made out of their own 
self-interest, irrespective of the interests of other property owners, or 
nonowners—especially nonowners who were somehow harmed by 
the owner’s use. The resulting games were noncooperative, and an 
understanding of Era III resource strategies is best studied in light of 
noncooperative game theory.132 
A.  The Rise of Property 
In Europe, and then in America, the idea of property was grounded 
in several assumptions. One was advanced by John Locke, who 
argued that ownership over a resource—particularly land—could 
arise through individual labor.133 But perhaps the most central 
assumption involves the workings of a market-based economic 
system. One may presume that such a system will permit market 
actors to exercise rights to perform certain actions with resources—
and to negotiate exchanges regarding resources—but only if there are 
zero or de minimis transaction costs. In a real world of positive and 
often high transaction costs, individuals in the market can take steps 
to increase the value of resources and of resource production if rights 
are assigned to those who can use them most productively, with 
incentives that induce them to do so, and the costs of rights  
132 DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 31, at 70–76; Alvin E. Roth, Editor’s Introduction 
and Overview, in GAME-THEORETIC MODELS OF BARGAINING 1–2 (Alvin E. Roth ed., 
1985). 
133 WILLIAM B. SCOTT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS: AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF 
PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 31 (1977). Locke also 
advocated the position that property was not necessarily something exclusively created by 
government, and that, indeed, property rights existed prior to government. JOHN LOCKE, 
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1988). Of course, other Era III 
philosophers, such as Jeremy Bentham, did not share Locke’s views on the origin of 
property. Bentham, for example, insisted that property cannot exist without government. 
ELLEN FRANKEL PAUL, MORAL REVOLUTION AND ECONOMIC SCIENCE 50 (1979). 
Debates about the true origins of property rights continue to this day. See, e.g., Saul 
Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S421 
(2002); Katrina Miriam Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of 
Private Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117 (2005). Irrespective of the exact source of 
property rights, only rights to resources that have been given official recognition by formal 
legal instrumentalities will likely be sustained if challenged in an administrative or judicial 
setting. Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, Property-Rights Regimes and Natural 
Resources: A Conceptual Analysis, 68 LAND ECON. 249, 252 (1992) (contrasting de jure 
property rights, which are acknowledged by government institutions, with de facto rights 
that originate among property owners who cooperate to define rights themselves). 
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transference to others are relatively low. Only an appropriate system 
of property rights, legitimized and enforced by the law, can bring 
about this result.134 The kind of property interest that is most 
consistent with a perfectly functioning market is a private property 
right to land and resources, encompassing the right of the owner to 
use this property to the exclusion of others, with the ability to transfer 
it to another.135 
Private property was not necessarily the first type of property 
interest to rise out of open access. Common or communal property, 
involving the exclusion of all but a group of insiders from access to 
some common resource, was probably the first kind of property 
regime to emerge.136 There were, however, several problems with 
common property systems. If the multiple owners did not have any 
internal structure of governance, they competed with one another for 
resource appropriation, resulting in an overuse of the resource similar 
to what had occurred on a smaller scale when open access was the 
norm. Although the owners could have agreed upon some rules of use 
by engaging in a cooperative game, there was always a tendency to 
defect from any agreement, especially if individual self-interest 
suggested a better short-term outcome.137 Even if the initial 
transaction costs of cooperation were surmountable, post-agreement 
enforcement and monitoring costs must have been considerable. 
Moreover, trespassing from outsiders would have increased the 
uncertainty about appropriate use levels for joint owners.138 
Common property regimes typically were successful when the 
resource was a common pool resource such as a pasture or a 
fishery.139 Even then, certain contextual and historic conditions had to 
be present before the communal property was enduring.140 What  
134 Ronald H. Coase, The Institutional Structure of Production, in NOBEL LECTURES: 
ECONOMIC SCIENCES 1991–1995, at 11–20 (Torsten Persson ed., 1997). 
135 NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 71, at 91. 
136 Thráinn Eggertsson, Open Access Versus Common Property, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 74–82, 84–85 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. 
McChesney eds., 2003). 
137 FISHER, supra note 118, at 4–5. 
138 See Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 102; Michael Taylor, The Economics 
and Politics of Property Rights and Common Pool Resources, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 633 
(1992). 
139 See, e.g., Robert McC. Netting, Of Men and Meadows: Strategies for Alpine Land 
Use, 45 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 132, 139–41 (1972); Wyman, supra note 133, at 126. 
140 OSTROM, supra note 97, at 90–102; DANIEL H. COLE, POLLUTION & PROPERTY 
112–20 (2002). 
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instead distinguished the Age of Property was the balkanization and 
privatization of land, resources, and natural assets. Ownership in Era 
III became individual, not shared, and the dominant property interest 
became private, not common.141 
The division of a commons or open access resource into individual 
parcels occurred in different ways in different parts of the world. In 
America, the law of property tended to reward individual initiative; 
ownership went to those who seized and claimed the resource. This 
notion of capture, similar to Locke’s labor theory, slowly transformed 
open access conditions into a multitude of private ownership interests. 
Individuals acquired, by possession and use, property rights in land,142 
and to natural resources such as minerals,143 water,144 forage,145 and 
even wild game.146 Applicable laws legitimated these interests, 
providing their owners with security and enforcement mechanisms 
should claim jumpers and competitors emerge.147 
For most natural resources, especially land, the property interest 
consisted of several operational rights held by the owner. Among the 
most important were the right to defined boundaries around the 
owned interest, the right to access and use the resource, the right to 
exclude others from it, and the right of alienation, i.e., sale, transfer, 
and lease. In common property regimes, different individual owners 
could possess some, but not all, of these rights.148 With private 
 
141 See Yoram Barzel, Property Rights in the Firm, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND THE LAW 43, 43–57 (Terry L. Anderson & Fred S. 
McChesney eds., 2003); Demsetz, supra note 122, at 355–57. 
142 See, e.g., Homestead Act of 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (repealed 1976). 
143 John Umbeck, Might Makes Rights: A Theory of the Formation and Initial 
Distribution of Property Rights, 19 ECON. INQUIRY 38, 40–43 (1981); General Mining Act 
of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91. 
144 Anderson & Hill, supra note 129, at 176–178. 
145 See generally TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NOT SO WILD, WILD 
WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER (2004). 
146 William T. Hornaday, The Extermination of the American Bison, in U.S. NATIONAL 
MUSEUM: ANNUAL REPORT 493 (1887) microformed on Western Americana: Frontier 
History of the Trans-Mississippi West, 1550-1900 No. 2661; 4 Ernest T. Seton, Lives of 
Game Animals 451 (1937). 
147 NORTH & THOMAS, supra note 71, at 7 (“[G]overnments [in Era IV] were able to 
define and enforce property rights at a lower cost than could voluntary groups, and . . . 
these gains became even more pronounced as markets expanded.”). 
148 Ostrom, supra note 97, at 250–54. 
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property, an owner typically held all of these rights, with the rights of 
use and exclusion being the most critical.149 
Since a private property owner was not only given the right to 
exclude all others, but also the exclusive use of the property interest, 
two implications followed. First, with private property came two 
classes of individuals interested in natural resources—owners and 
nonowners. Second, the exact nature and extent of the resource use 
was subject to the sole discretion of the owner. In Era III, where 
resource use was to dominate, owners and nonowners typically agreed 
that a resource should be used. If there was disagreement, it would 
likely have been over competing uses, not over whether the resource 
should be used at all. Similarly, since ownership and resource use 
were basically coterminous, there were little or no limits within the 
property right itself to deter overuse. 
B.  Resource Overuse and Large Group Externalities 
It is an irony of private property that its creation was in part based 
on the assumption that open access resources would be unsustainably 
exploited unless some property regime was imposed for their 
protection.150 However, rational property owners in Era III not only 
failed to conserve resources, they tended to knowingly exploit 
them.151 There were, and still are, several reasons for an owner’s urge 
to use land and resources. First, most property rights are inherently 
use rights, giving the owner the freedom to exploit the resource’s use 
component for his or her own benefit.152 Second, consistent with 
standard economic theory, it would be entirely rational for owners of 
renewable resources, e.g., range, pasture, timber, fish, or game, to use  
149 Barzel, supra note 141, at 43; Richard Stroup & John Baden, Property Rights and 
Natural Resource Management, 2 LITERATURE OF LIBERTY: A REVIEW OF LIBERAL 
THOUGHT 5–7 (1979), http://www.econlib.org/library/essays/LtrLbrty/strbdPR1.html 
(explaining that the right to use and the right to exert control over a resource is an 
important feature of a property right). The right of exclusion allows owners to decide who 
may enter a resource, which means they can capture for themselves (and for their 
offspring) the benefits from investments they undertake in a resource. Richard Posner, 
Economic Analysis of Law, in ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 12, 12–13 
(Bruce A. Ackerman ed., 1975). 
150 Hardin, supra note 80, at 1247. 
151 DANIEL W. BROMLEY, ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMY: PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 171 (1991); THOMAS MICHAEL POWER, LOST LANDSCAPES AND FAILED 
ECONOMICS: THE SEARCH FOR A VALUE OF PLACE 138 (1996). 
152 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY, vol. 1, § 11.01 (Michael Allen 
Wolf ed. 2007); Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern Property Law, 
41 STAN. L. REV. 1529, 1530 (1989). 
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their properties up to the point of resource extinguishment and 
exhaustion when the discount rate sufficiently exceeds the maximum 
reproductive potential of the resource, and an immediate profit can be 
made from harvesting the last remaining resource.153 Third, owners 
often have a relatively high discount rate, encouraging them to 
discount future costs and benefits quite heavily. High discount rates 
lead to exploitation and eventual loss of natural resources, particularly 
when the science behind resource renewal rates is not known or 
readily available.154 The slow but steady depletion of the resource use 
component during Era III, while not socially optimal, was consistent 
with the wishes of the private property owners—to maximize private 
but not social benefits. 
The law of private property was developed and then adopted in 
large part to permit the owner of a potentially valuable property to 
have exclusive use rights, free from other competing use interests.155 
While owners could, in theory, not use the resource they owned, that 
option was rarely exercised, either because there was no perceived 
value in an unused resource, or because it was flatly discouraged by 
applicable legal doctrine.156 As a matter of economic reality, a high 
Era III demand for raw materials rewarded decisions that maximized 
short-term profits for private entrepreneurs.157 With some renewable 
resources, such as fish, it even seemed rational for users to extinguish 
rather than conserve the resource.158 
The Era III resource use path, coupled with a failure to protect 
nonuse values, led to three environmental consequences. First, the 
world began to deplete its stock natural resources, especially energy 
 
153 Colin W. Clark, The Economics of Overexploitation, 181 SCIENCE 630, 630 (1973); 
Schlager & Ostrom, supra note 133, at 256. 
154 Colin W. Clark, Profit Maximization and the Extinction of Animal Species, 81 J. OF 
POL. ECON. 950, 951 (1973); Bruce A. Larson & Daniel W. Bromley, Property Rights, 
Externalities, and Resource Degradation: Locating the Tragedy, 33 J. DEV. ECON. 235 
(1990). 
155 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1356 
(1993). 
156 For example, western water law was and is characterized by a use-it-or-lose-it 
mentality that encouraged needless use in order to maintain rights, and punished 
conservation and nonuse, since saved water was often forfeited. See, e.g., Colorado Water 
Conservancy Dist. v. Shelton Farms, Inc., 529 P.2d 1321 (Colo. 1974); Stephen F. 
Williams, The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste in Water Resource 
Development, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 7 (1983). 
157 Zobler, supra note 22, at 190, 192. 
158 Gordon, supra note 118; Clark, supra note 154, at 950–51. 
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fuels and industrial minerals.159 The main driver of this resource 
demand was the need of rapidly industrializing European economies, 
as well as the burgeoning economy of the United States,160 to exploit 
the seemingly plentiful natural resources of the New World.161 The 
strength of the international market meant that natural resources that 
were not being used within the parent country could be transformed 
into other forms of capital by being traded to countries that needed 
them for economic growth.162 
Second, renewable biological resources such as fisheries, forests, 
and pasturelands became exploited. As a result of intensifying fishing 
efforts, one marine fishery after another collapsed in Era III.163 
Forests and woodlands shrank, accounting for perhaps half of the net 
deforestation in world history.164 Massive forest clearance reduced 
biodiversity, added carbon to the atmosphere, and exposed millions of 
square miles of soil to erosion. Rangelands and pasturelands become 
over-grazed, degrading or destroying naturally occurring grasslands, 
along with the considerable ecological values provided when these 
resources are not used as a commodity.165  
159 McNeill, supra note 4, at 51, 53–55. 
160 The United States, spurred on by the nation’s dreams of Manifest Destiny, also 
consumed its own land and natural resources on an unprecedented scale during Era III. 
Sandra Zellmer, Sustaining Geographies of Hope: Cultural Resources on Public Lands, 73 
U. COLO. L. REV. 413, 425 (2002). 
161 Era III is often referred to as the “Golden Age of Resource-Based Development.” 
EDWARD B. BARBIER, NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 81–83 
(2005); Alan Green & M.C. Urquhart, Factor and Commodity Flows in the International 
Economy of 1870–1914: A Multi-Country View, 36 J. ECON. HIST. 217, 247 (1976); 
Zobler, supra note 22, at 190. 
162 Ronald Findlay & Mats Lundahl, Natural Resources, “Vent-For-Surplus,” and the 
Staples Theory, in FROM CLASSICAL ECONOMICS TO DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 68 (G. 
Meier ed. 1994). 
163 See Jeremy B.C. Jackson et al., Historical Overfishing and the Recent Collapse of 
Coastal Ecosystems, 293 SCIENCE 629 (2001). See also McNeill, supra note 4, at 58 
(“Since the late 1980s, all marine fisheries have been exploited at or above sustainable 
levels.”). 
164 SING C. CHEW, WORLD ECOLOGICAL DEGRADATION: ACCUMULATION, 
URBANIZATION AND DEFORESTATION, 3000 B.C.–A.D. 2000, at 3 (2001); J.R. MCNEILL, 
SOMETHING NEW UNDER THE SUN: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY WORLD 229–37 (2000); DAVID EVANS, A HISTORY OF NATURE 
CONSERVATION IN BRITAIN 57 (Routledge, 2d ed. 1992). 
165 COLE, supra note 140, at 97 (explaining that in the early twentieth century, Great 
Britain “had the smallest percentage of forested land—just 3 percent—of any country in 
Europe”); see generally Joseph M. Feller & David E. Brown, From Old-Growth Forests to 
Old-Growth Grasslands: Managing Rangelands for Structure and Function, 42 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 319 (2000); LAITOS ET AL., NATURAL RESOURCE LAW 464–65 (2006). 
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Third, raw population growth, worldwide industrialization, and 
increasing combustion of fossil fuels for energy use required that the 
inevitable waste products of this resource use and consumption be 
deposited somewhere. The atmosphere, the hydrosphere, and the 
earth’s underground soils accepted the wastes and pollution of Era III. 
Because in most situations these naturally occurring resources were 
not owned (and in the case of air and many waters, not capable of 
ownership), the market’s pricing mechanism did not provide useful 
signals to those seeking a free depository for the growing amount of 
pollution that was being produced.166 As a result, pollutants 
accumulated faster than they could be absorbed, recycled, or 
dissipated. As Era III closed out in middle of the twentieth century, 
environmental goods with enormous nonuse value—such as the 
atmosphere, hydrosphere, and even the earth itself—were receiving 
overloads of pollutants, with increasingly disturbing consequences for 
both ecosystems and humans.167 
Resource owners and users in Era III were predictably acting in 
their own self-interest. Unfortunately, in overconsuming or overusing 
their resources, or exploiting public environmental goods such as the 
atmosphere, they imposed externalities upon a larger group that also 
had some stake in the resource. An externality occurs when some 
market activity, such as resource use, affects third parties who are not 
participants in that market activity, and there is an imposed cost on an 
outside party. In other words, an externality is more formally defined 
as an “unintended spillover effect,” where the costs or benefits of the 
activity are not adequately reflected in the price of the good. When 
numerous parties experience the spillover effect but are not 
responsible for the harm-producing activity, the result is a large group 
negative externality.168 
In Era III, the large group externality affected nonowners. They 
were either nonowners who wanted to use the resource in a way 
different than the owner’s use (or at another point in time), or who 
would have preferred that the resource not be used at all. For the first 
of these classes, the externality generated by the owner’s use 
negatively impacted the interests, or presumed profits, of the 
nonowner, the would-be user of the resource. An example of this kind  
166 COLE, supra note 140, at 2 (“In the absence of property rights to protect them, 
environmental goods have been abused, sometimes to the point of destruction.”). 
167 McNeill, supra note 4, at 55–56. 
168 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 128, at 14; Hsu, supra note 80, at 78. 
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of externality is evident when an owner of subsurface minerals 
extracts them and negatively affects the surface use of the land for 
agriculture. For nonowners who benefitted from the resource in its 
natural state, the externality generated by the owner’s use was the 
resulting degradation of nonuse values and benefits from indirect use. 
There was a large group temporal externality as well, because a 
suboptimal rate of resource use also imposed negative costs on future 
resource users, who lost future access to resources such as virgin 
forests. While commentators have pointed out that domestication of 
nature took place over thousands of years,169 the rate by which the 
human footprint affected natural settings intensified greatly during 
Era III. Such unprecedented human use forces future generations to 
engage in resource protective practices in order to maintain ecosystem 
service benefits. Heightened resource management, particularly in 
agricultural areas, perpetuated a profound long-term cycle of 
necessary management of human-altered ecosystems, by means of 
controlling fire, pests, and invasive species. The human imprint 
shifted the balance of the ecosystem, creating a new burden of future 
generations to continue these land management strategies.170 
The two most immediate large group externalities to arise in Era III 
involved the exploitation of renewable biological resources, and the 
pollution of public goods such as the atmosphere and hydrosphere. 
Deforestation, overfishing, drained wetlands, and grasslands removal 
had short-term effects on nonowners who otherwise would have 
benefitted from the indirect services and existence value provided by 
healthy forests,171 sustainable fisheries,172 functioning wetlands,173 and 
natural rangelands.174 Air and water pollution, as well as the toxic 
contamination of land, had very real health effects on individuals who 
did not own, and therefore had no control over, the enterprises 
 
169 See Peter Kareiva et al., Domesticated Nature: Shaping Landscapes and Ecosystems 
for Human Welfare, 316 SCIENCE 1866, 1866–67 (2007); see also Eric W. Sanderson et 
al., The Human Footprint and the Last of the Wild, 52 BIOSCIENCE 891, 892 (2002). 
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Agronomy?, 100 AGRONOMY J. 22 (2008). 
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responsible for the waste disposal practices.175 The consequences of 
stock resource depletion were not as immediately experienced, 
because new sources seemed to be constantly discovered.176 However, 
the relentless removal of fossil fuels and valuable minerals would 
eventually adversely affect nonowners in Era IV, because by then 
newly discovered sources were far less plentiful, which meant that 
diminished supply and higher prices would become the norm. 
C.  Resource Popularity Conflicts and Noncooperative Games 
The ubiquitous nature of private property law gradually divided the 
universe of parties interested in land and natural resources into two 
classes—owners and nonowners. Nonowners, in turn, consisted of 
those who also wished to use the owner’s resource but could not do 
so, and those who held nonuse values for a resource. During Era III, 
owners typically were authorized, even encouraged, to use their 
property for their own short-term self-interest.177 When an owner’s 
use of a resource created conflict with nonowners who also wished to 
use that resource, these conflicts were usually sorted out by private 
property law.178 The owner who held a property right to land or some 
natural resource had the legal right to use that resource and exclude 
nonowner, would-be users from it. Owners could also erect 
boundaries to keep this class of nonowners away, and to protect the 
owner’s interests in a wide range of uses.179 
If a nonowner wished to use an owner’s property, in theory, the 
nonowner could engage in a cooperative game in order to produce a 
socially optimal result,180 where, by contract and agreement, the 
nonowner would be able to purchase and acquire some ownership or 
 
175 The most serious resource exploitation involved the use of the atmosphere, 
hydrosphere, and soils as sinks for all manner of pollutants, because there are no 
substitutes for human uses of air, water, and earth. McNeill, supra note 4, at 51. 
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use interest from the owner.181 However, the size of the group of 
nonowners affected by owners’ resource use could potentially have 
been so large and diffuse that coordinating strategies between owners 
and nonowners would have been practically impossible. Since owners 
had a legally protected right to use their own resources, and since Era 
III positive law did not penalize use of environmental public goods as 
pollution sinks, owners likely were unwilling to engage in a strategy 
of mutual cooperation with nonowners that would have reduced the 
rate of resource use. 182 As a result, nonowners were often affected by 
an owner’s resource use strategy, but they had no legal recourse to 
influence or deter the owner. Nonowners and nonusers were not 
players in the Era III resource use game. 
Owners could safely ignore the plight of these nonowners, because 
those who were affected by resource overuse were powerless to halt, 
slow, or influence an owner’s choices regarding resources. 
Unfortunately, nonowners either harmed by or benefitting from the 
owner’s resource use were unable to engage in even noncooperative 
games in Era III. Although there were large group negative 
externalities experienced by these nonowners,183 applicable law did 
not provide them with any effective legal recourse to halt an owner’s 
exploitation of either an owned natural resource or an unowned 
environmental public good.184 It was not until laws and legal 
institutions in Era IV gave legal stature to the nonuse interests of 
nonowners that they could become players in the resource game. 
The suboptimal rate of resource use that dominated Era III was the 
result of information failures about stock depletion in the case of 
nonrenewable resources, the carrying capacity of the land, and the 
rate of regeneration for renewable resources. The rush of private 
landowners to produce commodities and short-term profits (along 
with considerable externalities) can be illustrated by a simplistic, 
noncooperative game theory model.185 If the participants in a resource  
181 See supra notes 85–90 and accompanying text.  
182 McNeill, supra note 4, at 51. 
183 See supra notes 159–70 and accompanying text. 
184 Era III laws available to those adversely affected by an owner’s overuse of a 
resource usually consisted of either common law nuisance doctrine or primitive anti-
pollution regulations. These were rarely effective in curbing an owner’s use preferences. 
See generally Jan G. Laitos, Legal Institutions and Pollution: Some Intersections Between 
Law and History, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 423 (1975). 
185 Of course, specific local or state laws could facilitate different noncooperative game 
scenarios. For the purpose of illustration, we have selected a simple model with the most 
basic economic assumptions of a game theory model. Variations of different 
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game are either unable or unwilling to coordinate their behavior (in 
this case, resource conservation), and if they instead choose their 
strategies regarding the resource independently, then the resulting 
game becomes a noncooperative game.186 In a noncooperative game, 
like a cooperative game, every player is assumed to be rational; a 
rational player will choose an action that leads to the outcome that 
player prefers, given what that player expects the other players to 
do.187 Unlike a cooperative game, a noncooperative game does not 
require coordination among the players, and there are no cooperative 
enforceable agreements made between players that will allow them to 
maximize their gains collectively.188 
Players engaged in a noncooperative game are not necessarily 
doomed to experience chaos.189 In 1950, Nobel Prize laureate Dr. 
John Nash proved that even noncooperative games can yield a 
equilibrium between the players.190 This is now called a Nash 
equilibrium. When players find themselves in a noncooperative game, 
there is either a unique solution or a set of available solutions that will 
produce maximum payoffs for each player in the game, given the 
likely strategies of the other players.191 In a Nash equilibrium, each 
player is informed of the others’ strategies, and each player makes the 
optimal choice given what the other players might choose. There is no 
further benefit for a player to change strategies if the strategies of the 
other players remain unchanged.192 In other words, a Nash 
equilibrium does not necessarily coincide with Pareto optimality; a 
Nash equilibrium is defined as the best strategy for that player, when 
all other players in the noncooperative game are playing their best 
 
noncooperative game models can be adapted to reflect nuances in property law. 
Furthermore, assigning probabilities to different strategies and relaxing assumptions may 
yield different equilibriums. These variations are voluminous and beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
186 LARRY SAMUELSON, EVOLUTIONARY GAMES AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 1, 10 
(1998). 
187 See generally TIM HARFORD, THE LOGIC OF LIFE: THE RATIONAL ECONOMICS OF 
AN IRRATIONAL WORLD (2008). 
188 Scott Borg, Finding Sanity With Game Theory, STRATEGY & BUSINESS at 2, 
available at http://www.strategy-business.com/article/8527?gko=e6930. 
189 See generally James W. Friedman, A Noncooperative Equilibrium for Super Games, 
38 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 1 (1971). 
190 Nash, Jr., supra note 27, at 155; John F. Nash, Jr., Equilibrium Points in n-Person 
Games, 36 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. 48 (1950). 
191 Id. 
192 DIXIT & NALEBUFF, supra note 31, at 77. 
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strategy. There is not necessarily a unique Nash equilibrium and it is 
not uncommon for multiple Nash equilibria to exist. 
Resource owners in Era III engaged in a high rate of resource 
consumption that can be explained by a classic game of “chicken.” 
Like the game of chicken, each resource player recognizes that their 
continued course of action may have detrimental consequences. 
However, the short-term gain of winning is so high that players are 
deterred from their hazardous, high-consequence course of action. 
The game has been heavily studied and adapted in several contexts to 
explain brinkmanship that pushes noncooperative behavior to the 
point of near disaster.193 In the game of chicken, the Nash equilibrium 
is that of suboptimal use.194 Consider a situation where the players 
drive toward each other on a single track at a high speed until one 
“chickens out,” and swerves off the track to avoid colliding. The 
player who swerves gains nothing, and the player who stays on track 
gains everything. Neither player wants to yield to the other. Given the 
strategies of the other player in the game and the fact that players 
cannot communicate their intentions, the best strategy for each player 
is to select the course opposite of their opponent. Since both players 
assume that their opponent is rational and would prefer not to have a 
head-on collision, the Nash equilibrium strategy is to select the 
opposite of an opponent’s course. The opponents are “deadlocked” 
because both assume that the other will back down. 
The game played between owner-users in Era III is analogous to 
the chicken game. Two resource user-owners—suppose they are 
foresters—have incentive to clear-cut and supply as much wood to the 
market as possible to gain financial rewards. While it would be 
socially optimal to conserve the wood production in order to sustain 
the forest, each producer has incentive to clear-cut and gain market 
share if the opponent chooses conservation. The nonuser, who may 
have an interest in the existence value of the forest for its beauty, or 
who would benefit from forest nonuse because then it would supply 
oxygen, is not even a player in this game. But the nonuser would 
experience the negative externality of clear-cutting. 
The payoffs and Nash equilibrium are illustrated in Figure E. 
Forester 2 may either conserve (upper left box), or clear-cut (upper 
right box). If Forester 2 conserves, Forester 1 experiences a high  
193 AVINASH K. DIXIT & SUSAN SKEATH, GAMES OF STRATEGY 457 (1999). 
194 Evolutionary biology has been likened to a game of chicken. See J. Maynard Smith 
& G.R. Price, The Logic of Animal Conflict, 246 NATURE 15 (1973). 
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payoff (5) from clear-cutting the forest, while Forester 2 experiences 
a much lower pay-out (1) due to Forester 1’s market domination. 
Likewise, if Forester 1 conserves, Forester 2 experiences a high 
payoff (5) from clear-cutting the forest, while Forester 1 experiences 
a much lower payout (1) due to Forester 2’s market domination. If 
both clear-cut, there will be a negative payout to both. But because 
this is a noncooperative game, both foresters will clear-cut the forest, 
even though this strategy produces the least desirable result for the 
two players and for society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note that the number in each box on the left is the Forester 1’s 
payoff; the number on the right is Forester 2’s payoff. The  Nash 
equilibrium solution is highlighted. 
The owner-user foresters are deadlocked in trying to anticipate 
their opponent’s strategy. As a result, there is an endless bout of 
suboptimal resource use. The foresters, nonusers, and ecosystem 
suffer as a result. 
V 
ERA IV—THE ANTHROCENE AGE 
By the middle of the twentieth century, a new era had swept much 
of the planet, and its legal institutions. Era IV may be called the 
Anthrocene Age because of the prominent role played by human 
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anthropogenic decisions.195 Era IV, which continues to the present, 
has three prominent anthropocentric characteristics: (1) continued 
suboptimal use of some resources, (2) laws requiring individuals and 
entities to comply with regulations in order to protect indirect 
resource values that provide human benefit, and (3) new laws that for 
the first time recognize and uphold human preferences for nonuse 
values. Throughout Era IV, the resource economy increasingly came 
under political and governmental control; however, these twentieth 
century laws were anthropocentric and designed to protect resource 
indirect use and nonuse values primarily for the benefit of humans.196 
During Era IV, scientific knowledge emerged to document the 
human benefits gained from indirect resource benefits such as clean 
air and clean water. Most western countries, particularly the United 
States, enacted environmental protection laws that undermined 
absolutist notions of property rights prevalent in Era III. In Era IV, 
unlike Era III, ownership of natural resources no longer conferred 
unchecked authority over their extraction and development. The 
creation of scientifically grounded Best Management Practices 
(BMPs) and other science-based environmental standards resulted in 
regulations aimed to limit the external costs and deleterious effects on 
indirect uses imposed by an individual’s private resource use.197 
Furthermore, the Era III preservation movement, ignited by prominent 
writings and activism of naturalists from this time period, gained 
momentum and popularity in Era IV, particularly in the last decade of 
the twentieth century.198 Human preferences for resource existence  
195 See Daniel H. Cole, Climate Change, Adaption, and Development, 26 J. ENVTL. L. 1 
(2008); ANDREW REVKIN, GLOBAL WARMING: UNDERSTANDING THE FORECAST 55 
(1992); see generally Michael Williams, Forests, in THE EARTH AS TRANSFORMED BY 
HUMAN ACTION: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CHANGE OVER THE PAST 300 YEARS 179 (B.L. 
Turner II et al. eds., 1990). 
196 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, 528 U.S. 167, 
181 (2000) (“The relevant showing for purposes of Article III standing, however, is not 
injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff.”); The National Environmental Policy 
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (2006) (“[T]he continuing policy of the Federal Government [is] 
. . . to use all practicable means and measures . . . in a manner calculated to . . . maintain 
conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the . . . 
requirements of future generations of Americans.”); see also Gunther Handle, Human 
Rights and Protection of the Environment, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL 
RIGHTS 304–05 (Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause & Allan Rosas eds., 2001). 
197 ROBERT GOTTLEIB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENT MOVEMENT 113 (1993); Wash. State Dep’t of Natural Res. v. 
Browning, 199 P.3d 430 (Wash. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding state agency stop work orders 
prohibiting timber owner from harvesting trees). 
198 See Meyer, supra note 24. 
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values were validated in Era IV by the passage of several laws to 
protect resource nonuse values. For example, the U.S. Forest Service, 
which manages multiple use lands, is mandated to consider ecosystem 
integrity and use and nonuse values (such as forestry, grazing, 
recreation, and wilderness).199 
Increased government presence yielded two principal results: first, 
legislation and government enforcement that aimed to reduce negative 
externalities imposed by direct uses, and second, increased 
government ownership of public lands. Governments also gained 
momentum in acquiring public ownership interests in valuable 
resources, including land, in order to reduce exploitation of unowned 
public goods.200 Increased scientific knowledge and changing public 
preferences led to an affirmative duty imposed on Era IV public land 
managers to protect indirect and nonuse values threatened by use 
demands,201 and to impose nonuse values on certain lands that might 
otherwise have seemed important only for use potential.202 These new 
Era IV laws restricted or prevented direct resource use. They also 
advanced the anthropocentric goals of protecting indirect uses, e.g., 
public goods healthy for humans, and nonuse values, e.g., option and 
existence values. 
Era IV laws have created, and given legal power to, an important 
new interest to be reckoned with when considering our relationship to 
natural resources—resource indirect use and nonuse, for the benefit of 
humans. These laws give individuals, organizations, and even 
governments that value indirect use and nonuse of resources the legal 
ability to directly challenge both private and public resource use 
decisions that compromise the human interest in nonuse values.203 
Those asserting anthropocentric indirect use and nonuse interests have  
199 JOHN B. LOOMIS, INTEGRATED PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT (Columbia Univ. 
Press, 2d ed. 2002). 
200 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007) (emission of 
greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere contribute to global warming, which is 
experienced by those who emit these gases, and those who do not). 
201 See 16 U.S.C. § 1132 (2006) (future protection of roadless areas within national 
forests); 43 U.S.C. § 1782(a) (2006) (protection of wilderness study areas within U.S. 
Bureau of Land Management lands); Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 
(2006). 
202 See, e.g., Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (2006); 1968 Wild and Scenic 
Rivers Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271–1287; Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136. 
203 RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 80–83 (2004). Era 
IV laws also permit those interested in the nonuse component of land to create an 
ownership interest in that component. See also ELIZABETH BYERS & KARIN MARCHETTI 
PONTE, THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT HANDBOOK (2d ed. 2005). 
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taken on resource use interest in three settings: private resource 
owners who use, or wish to use, resources under their control;204 
public resource owners who use, or authorize private use of, resources 
owned by some government entity;205 and users who exploit an 
unowned resource.206 
Despite the ubiquity of laws authorizing resource nonusers to 
challenge resource use decisions for anthropocentric ends, the harsh 
reality is that the world’s resource base continues to diminish below 
suboptimal levels,207 and natural systems continue to degrade and 
disappear.208 There are, of course, many asserted and demonstrated 
reasons for the world’s persistent pursuit of the use values associated 
with resources.209 These range from exponentially increasing 
populations, to ever-increasing demand for raw materials from 
developing countries and certain sectors of the American economy 
that see their survival linked to resource use, to the human tendency 
to discount the value of future benefits associated with present 
conservation. 
Market failures, such as unowned public goods, and government 
failures stemming from the management of these public goods also 
yield a suboptimal level of natural systems and natural resources in 
Era IV, much like they did in Era III. Ironically, increased 
government intervention itself has yielded government failures, an 
overcorrection stemming from attempts to address market 
imperfections. Government command and control policies mandating 
compliance with air and water quality standards do not provide  
204 See, e.g., Davis v. Agua Sierra Res., L.L.C., 174 P.3d 298 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) 
(challenging the withdrawal of percolating groundwater by the overlying landowner). 
205 See Sue Major Holmes, Judge Backs BLM Plan on Gas Drilling in N.M., DENV. 
POST, Oct. 10, 2008, at B2 (describing an environmental challenge to a Bureau of Land 
Management plan contemplating 10,000 new gas wells in northern New Mexico). 
206 See El Comite Para El Bienestar v. Warmerdam, 539 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(citizen group challenge to emissions of volatile organic compounds into California’s 
atmosphere). 
207 DON HINRICHSEN ET AL., CONSEQUENCES OF OVERUSE AND POLLUTION, XXVI 
POPULATION REPORTS, ch. 4 (Population Info. Program ed., 1998); Elisabeth Rosenthal & 
Andrew C. Revkin, Science Panel Calls Global Warming “Unequivocal,” N.Y. TIMES, 
Feb. 3, 2007, at A1; WILLIAM MCKIBBEN, THE END OF NATURE 51 (2006). 
208 See Thomas L. Friedman, In the Age of Noah, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2007, available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/23/opinion/23friedman.html; MICHAEL 
SHELLENBERGER & TED NORDHAUS, THE DEATH OF ENVIRONMENTALISM: GLOBAL 
WARMING POLITICS IN A POST-ENVIRONMENTAL WORLD (2004), available at 
http://www.thebreakthrough.org/images/Death_of _Environmentalism.pdf. 
209 See SHELLENBERGER & NORDHAUS, supra note 208. 
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incentives to jointly improve productivity, and typically lead to 
further inefficiencies and mislaid incentives to protect use, indirect 
use, and nonuse interests.210 Furthermore, government intervention 
explicitly developed to conserve resource use has also crowded out 
the private provisioning of public goods, such as open space.211 
Ultimately, this public action can yield a suboptimal production of 
environmental goods.212 
Put in terms of game theory, Era IV laws legitimized a new player 
in natural resources games. This player had preferences for indirect 
uses and nonuses, and was legally empowered to resist user interests. 
Instead of simple user versus user games so prevalent in Eras II and 
III, in Era IV the games increasingly involved humans who believed 
their indirect use and nonuse interests would be harmed by resource 
use. Resource users were private resource owners, public resource 
owners who either used resources directly, or who authorized private 
use, or users of unowned public good resources. The new player, a 
resource nonuser, was a protector of natural systems for human-
centric reasons. Not to be confused with nonuse values, which are 
essentially existence values, resource nonusers included individuals 
with preferences for (1) indirect use benefits that followed from a 
clean, unpolluted environment; (2) option values for possible future 
nonconsumptive use, such as low-impact recreation; and (3) nonuse 
interests, such as existence values realized when humans left a 
resource alone. Resource nonusers were individuals, resource-
protective organizations, and government entities empowered to 
enforce new Era IV laws. 
While motivations differed, the commonality is that nonusers 
demonstrated anthropocentric ambitions. Even nonusers with 
existence values presented anthropocentric preferences that furthered 
the rights of humans. While nonusers and users may have approached 
the resource differently, the anthropocentric focus resulted in 
suboptimal, unsustainable resource use, regardless of whether the 
game was cooperative or noncooperative. Achieving cooperation 
requires considerable coordination, often times imposing high 
transaction costs and requiring agency-based collaborative  
210 Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227, 1236 (1995). 
211 See Theodore Bergstrom et al., On the Private Provision of Public Goods, 29 J. 
PUB. ECON. 25, 25–49 (1986). 
212 See generally Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, Easy Riders, Joint Production, and 
Public Goods, 94 ECON. J. 580, 580–98 (1984). 
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facilitation.213 As noted in Part IV C, noncooperative games do not 
yield agreements between players that will allow them to maximize 
their gains collectively.214 Such games, because they are refereed by 
proscriptive laws between two opposing interests, usually lead to a 
win-lose outcome. Such an outcome is neither a collectively optimal 
result nor an efficient result for the players.215 
A.  Resource Use and Anthropogenic Harm 
Throughout Eras I and II, humans viewed nature, and natural 
resources, as either a source of cheap or free exploitable wealth, or a 
virtually costless dumping ground for wastes. Common law doctrine 
and resource-use friendly government agencies and courts validated 
human enterprises using resources for economic gain.216 Nonuse 
interests were largely silent, in large part due to an absence of legal 
legitimacy for nonuse values.217 
By Era IV, this unchecked use had been spurred on by an 
accelerated demand for raw materials. The earth’s population was 
increasing almost exponentially. Economic growth among western 
countries was the norm, developing nations such as China and India 
put new demands on natural resource products, and resources were 
both the fuel for this growth and a free waste receptacle for growth’s 
discarded byproducts.218 Human resource use patterns fundamentally 
reshaped the earth; the planet was human-dominated and permanently 
altered.219 Much of this mid-twentieth century transformation had 
serious negative effects on resource availability and viability.  
213 See generally Holly Wise Bender & Wade E. Martin, Modelling Conflict Using 
Spatial Voting Games: An Application to USDA Forest Service Lands, 12 INT’L J. ENV’T 
& POLLUTION 217 (1999). 
214 See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra notes 185–88 and accompanying text. 
216 See, e.g., Ebbetts Pass Forest Watch v. Cal. Dept. of Forestry and Fire Prot., 183 
P.3d 1210, 1226 (Cal. 2008) (approving timber harvesting plans despite concerns about 
environmental impacts); Adaven Mgmt., Inc. v. Mountain Falls Acquisition, Corp., 191 
P.3d 1189, 1192–96 (Nev. 2008) (discussing “anti-speculation” doctrine in western water 
law, which ensures that property right in water is put to “beneficial use”); Karl Vick, 
Secret Deal May Speed Development of Forest Land, DENV. POST, July 6, 2008, at 7A 
(timber company approved by the U.S. Forest Service to build homes on forest land). 
217 See supra notes 183–84 and accompanying text. 
218 See ZOBLER, supra note 22, at 190. 
219 Peter M. Vitousek, et al., Human Domination of Earth’s Ecosystem, 277 SCIENCE 
494, 498 (1997). See also Peter Kareiva et al., Domesticated Nature: Shaping Landscapes 
and Ecosystems for Human Welfare, 316 SCIENCE 1866 (2007) (we have converted 
roughly “50% of the world’s surface . . . to grazed land or cultivated crops”). 
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Era IV laws did have some effect on some dimensions of resource 
pollution and depletion. However, by the twenty-first century other 
indicators of environmental quality had declined.220 Notably, carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases had increased.221 This change 
resulted in what many scientists believed to be anthropocentrically 
induced global climate change.222 These deleterious impacts on 
resources eventually alarmed humans, who began not only to take 
note of a diminished resource base, but also feared human health 
threats from environmental pollution.223 Eventually, fears about 
environmental degradation raised doubts about humankind’s very 
survival. These anthropocentric fears caused us to turn to laws and 
legal institutions to address the growing exploitation of open access 
resources and the onslaught of negative environmental externalities.224 
Apart from concerns about how resource overuse might adversely 
affect humans, evidence was also mounting that natural resources 
played an important ecological and biological role when they were 
not being exploited by humans. Just as exploitation of resources 
produced large group negative externalities, it was becoming equally 
clear that, when left alone and not used, certain natural resources 
 
220 According to the theory of the environmental Kuznets curve, based on the work of 
Simon Kuznets, environmental quality is expected to increase as per capita income 
increases. See generally Simon Kuznets, Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of 
Nations, VIII: The Distribution of Income by Size, ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE, 
Jan. 1963, at 1. 
221 Elaborations and laboratory experiments have since documented that improvements 
in environmental quality with increases in average income may not be the case in practice. 
Specifically, greenhouse gases do not actually decline when worldwide per capita income 
increases, implying that wealthier nations may reduce pollution in some areas, but 
greenhouse gas emissions may increase. See generally David I. Stern et al., Economic 
Growth and Environmental Degradation: The Environmental Kuznets Curve and 
Sustainable Development, 24 WORLD DEV. 1151–60 (1996). 
222 RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING 
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 353 (1999); ANDREW 
GOUDIE, THE HUMAN IMPACT ON THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 167 (4th ed. 1994). 
223 HERMAN E. DALY & JOSHUA FARLEY, ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS PRINCIPLES AND 
APPLICATIONS (2004); Schlager & Ostrom, supra note 133, at 279; see also Developing 
Nations Balk at Climate Plan, DENV. POST, July 10, 2008, at 7A (the five main developing 
nations—China, India, Brazil, Mexico, and South Africa—rejected a goal for reducing 
global emissions of greenhouse gases, “since it is wealthier countries that have [already] 
created most of the environmental damage”). 
224 San Antonio Conservation Soc’y v. Tex. Highway Dep’t, 400 U.S. 968, 969–71 
(1970) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Pannaro Energy, Inc. v. Mont. Bd. of Envtl. 
Review, 199 P.3d 191, 194 (Mont. 2008) (agency concerned that water produced from 
privately-owned coal bed methane gas had a harmful effect on soils and stream life). 
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generated positive externalities.225 For example, naturally occurring 
wetlands, whether unowned or privately owned, perform and provide 
several valuable ecosystem services, such as flood control and 
pollution filtration.226 Since the market normally does not take into 
account such nonuse benefits when decisions are being made about 
resource use,227 methodologies were developed in Era IV to attempt to 
measure such values, such as contingent valuation.228 
B.  Anthropocentric Laws Protecting 
Resource Human Indirect Use and Nonuse Values 
As resource exploitation posed growing threats to both humans and 
ecosystems, new Era IV laws began to legitimate and empower 
resource nonusers. This player had been largely powerless in Era 
III,229 but now it had a battery of statutory weapons to resist harmful 
resource use when the use adversely affected human nonuse values.230 
Era III laws had embraced largely absolutist notions of private 
property rights, which assumed that ownership conferred upon 
owners plenary authority to engage in maximum resource 
appropriation and exploitation.231 By contrast, the core premise of 
many Era IV laws was that the sovereign’s police power could 
regulate private activities, including the natural environment that 
adversely affected human health and welfare. 
Governments in two ways asserted public rights protecting 
anthropocentric values threatened by excessive resource use. First, 
they claimed resources—often open access resources—as publicly  
225 Ironically, once domesticated and managed, many natural resources require active 
management by humans to maintain positive benefits. Prominent examples are the 
infiltration of invasive plant species in former pasturelands and years of wildfire 
mitigation that have led to wildfires in the urban-rural interface. Human disturbance often 
yields a necessary cycle of land management, making the return to a truly natural system 
very difficult to achieve. 
226 See RUHL ET AL., supra note 7, at 64–65. 
227 Andrew Balmford et al., Economic Reasons for Conserving Wild Nature, 297 
SCIENCE 950, 952–53 (2002). 
228 Marino Gatto & Giulio A. De Leo, Pricing Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services: 
The Never-Ending Story, 50 BIOSCIENCE 347 (2000) (Revealed preference or hedonic 
pricing are other methods that try to capture the worth of resource’s nonuse values. These 
impute some of the value of one good or service traded in the market to the presence of 
another attribute that is not traded.). 
229 See supra Figure E in Part IV.C. 
230 See LAZARUS, supra note 203, at 47–113. 
231 ROBERT GOTTLIEB, FORCING THE SPRING: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT 7–8 (1992). 
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owned property. Most western countries did this by establishing 
national forests, national parks, national rangelands, and other public 
lands.232 Second, governments imposed public rights through the 
regulation of private resource use. Governments did this by regulating 
both private use of open access233 and privately owned resources.234 
Although perceived threats to human health were primary drivers 
for the adoption of these laws, another motive for this unparalleled 
government intervention lay in our gradual realization that natural 
systems generate positive spillovers, indirect uses, and nonuse values 
for the benefit of humans. This recognition of unused nature justified 
restrictions on private use decisions regarding resources. Humans also 
discovered that they cared deeply about preserving, from 
development and alteration, certain locations characterized as 
wildlands,235 wildlife, and endangered species and their habitats.236 
Part of this benefit involved personal, sometimes mystical feelings 
people had toward nature.237 Some of the benefit was due to a 
realization that humans and their natural environment are closely 
linked and mutually interdependent.238 Ecologists and economists 
have tried to estimate the quantitative value to the world’s economic 
well-being that was provided by productive natural systems—a 1997 
publication in Nature concluded that the total annual global value of 
ecosystem services was between 16 and 54 trillion dollars.239 
Such psychological, ecological, and economic factors influenced 
lawmakers, who in Era IV found themselves under pressure to  
232 COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 128, at 325–26. 
233 See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006) (imposing a system of 
public rights and private duties regarding the atmosphere); State ex rel. State Eng’r v. 
Comm’r of Public Lands, 200 P.3d 86, 99 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008) (under federal reserved 
rights doctrine, federal government may impliedly reserve water and exempt it from 
appropriation under state law). 
234 See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. Kard, 199 P.3d 629 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2008) (home builders challenging state air quality permits required for earth-moving 
operations on privately owned lands). 
235 See, e.g., Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131–1136 (2006). 
236 See, e.g., Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006); Tenn. Valley 
Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Nat’l Wildlife Refuge Improvement Act of 1997, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 668dd–668ee (2006). 
237 See, e.g., Wallace Stegner, Why We Need Wilderness, MOTHER EARTH NEWS, 
Aug./Sept. 2004, at 64, 65. 
238 Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling 
of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1126–27 (1994). 
239 Robert Constanza et al., The Value of the World’s Ecosystem Services and Natural 
Capital, 387 NATURE 253, 259 (1997). 
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acknowledge values of the natural world. However, throughout Era 
IV, the laws and legal doctrine that sought to protect the indirect use 
and nonuse components of resources did so for largely 
anthropocentric ends. It was the public’s right to the benefits of 
resource nonuse that became legally protected; it usually was not the 
resource’s right to remain in a natural state.240 The new statutes and 
regulations focused on the harmful impacts that resource use 
decisions had on individual humans, rather than on the natural 
environment itself.241 American environmental laws enacted in the 
latter half of the twentieth century seemed little concerned about the 
injuries to natural resources caused by overuse. Instead, these laws 
were more intent on the threats to personal health and welfare that 
followed from environmental degradation.242 This anthropocentric 
emphasis is particularly evident with laws addressing overuse of open 
access resources.243 Even under the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA), when federal resource use actions are proposed, an 
impact statement must be prepared only if the action might affect “the 
quality of the human environment . . . .”244 Many federal natural 
resources laws enacted in Era IV also emphasized the need for 
 
240 There were some exceptions to the law’s inclination to acknowledge and protect 
nonuse values so as to primarily advance strictly human ends. See Just v. Marinette Cnt’y, 
201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2006) (for certain hazardous 
waste disposal sites subject to cleanup under CERCLA, a federal or state “trustee” may be 
designated to assess damages to natural resources); Katrina M. Wyman, The Property 
Challenges in Marine Fisheries, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 511, 513–15, 528–29 (2008) (discussing 
“no take areas” for certain marine fisheries, where extractive uses are prohibited and 
nonuse values are preserved). 
241 Gunther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment: A Mildly 
“Revisionist” View, in HUMAN RIGHTS, SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
ENVIRONMENT 117 (Antonio Trindade ed., 1992). 
242 LAZARUS, supra note 203, at 59. 
243 The 1970 Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2006), requires that national ambient 
air quality standards be established for the protection of public health. The 1972 Clean 
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2006), requires that the waters of the United States be 
fishable and swimmable. Amendments to the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 6924(a) (2006), call for disposal regulations for hazardous waste “as may be 
necessary to protect human health.” The Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq. (2006), 
requires the cleanup of abandoned and inactive hazardous waste sites containing 
substances that could be toxic or harmful to humans. 
244 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) (emphasis added). 
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publicly owned lands to be conserved and preserved because of “the 
anthropocentric virtues of wild lands.” 245 
The law of standing similarly evolved to ensure that courts will not 
hear from plaintiffs raising the interests of natural resources; rather, it 
is only through the transformation of such interests into harms to 
persons that violations of environmentally protective laws can be 
remedied by courts.246 Under Article III of the U.S. Constitution, if 
some resource nonuse attribute is threatened or harmed by a resource 
use decision, those wishing to challenge that action in court must 
claim that they have somehow been injured.247 To satisfy standing 
requirements the injury must be to the human plaintiff,248 and it is 
irrelevant that the underlying harm is to some otherwise protected 
natural resource.249 Even in environmental lawsuits brought under the 
generous review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, it is 
the human plaintiff’s interests in protecting and preserving resource 
nonuse from use that is the focus of a court’s initial inquiry.250 Yet the 
overuse of a resource that impairs that resource’s nonuse component 
itself rarely attaches to identifiable humans, even when human 
plaintiffs allege “concrete and particularized” harm sufficient to 
satisfy standing requirements in court.251 
An anthropocentric focus also affects cost-benefit analysis 
undertaken as a condition of environmentally protective legal action. 
If the cost of excessive resource use is only measured in human lives 
lost or human health impaired, the staggering nonuse values that are 
lost to the planet may be overlooked.252 If one seeks to measure the 
benefits of nonuse, the accounting scope required to monetize the  
245 Sandra Zellmer, A Preservation Paradox: Political Prestidigitation and an 
Enduring Resource of Wildness, 34 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1040 (2004); Wilderness Act of 
1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(b), (c) (2006); LAZARUS, supra note 203, at 93. 
246 See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 
181 (2000). 
247 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734–35 (1972). 
248 See Weaver’s Cove Energy v. R.I. Dep’t of Envtl. Mgmt., 524 F.3d 1330, 1333 
(D.C. Cir. 2008). 
249 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992) (“But the ‘injury in fact’ 
test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires that the party seeking 
review be . . . injured.” (quoting Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 734–35). 
250 Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167–68 (1997); Salmon Spawning & Recovery 
Alliance v. United States, 532 F.3d 1338, 1347 n.7 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
251 Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 433, 467 (2008). 
252 See, e.g., James Salzman, Barton H. Thompson, Jr. & Gretchen C. Daily, Protecting 
Ecosystem Services: Science, Economics, and Law, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 309 (2001). 
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value to the earth for leaving a resource alone is monumental and will 
likely present much controversy.253 
C.  The Rise of a New Player in the Resource Game 
In Era II, disputes over resources were typically between users who 
may have wished to use the same resource. With the emergence of 
contract law, these Era II users could sometimes engage in 
cooperative games, presented earlier in Figure B. At times, such 
agreements resulted in cooperation and win-win solutions to the 
conflict. In Era III, with the arrival of private property law, the two 
competing users were often user-owners and nonowners who wanted 
to use the resource. Since user-owners had the weight of property 
ownership justifying their use, few cooperative games were played 
with nonowner, would-be users. Also, during Era III another player 
arose—the nonowner who was harmed by resource use by 
experiencing negative externalities and by losing the positive nonuse 
values that were degraded by excessive resource use. But throughout 
most of Era III, this third player had no legal stature and therefore 
could largely be ignored by resource users. 
All this changed in Era IV.254 Users either had ownership rights 
permitting use, e.g., when the user was either a private or public 
owner, or in the case of an unowned resource, confronted no market 
barriers to resource exploitation. By contrast, nonusers had the ability 
to deploy Era IV laws, which gave them the legal power to curb or 
halt harmful use of both owned and unowned resources.255 Users and 
nonusers with opposing interests often went toe to toe with equally 
viable legal support, and the frequent and often anticipated conflict 
made it difficult to predict whether the resulting game would be 
cooperative or noncooperative. 
 
253 Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A 
Pragmatic Reorientation, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 433, 456 (2008); see, e.g., Entergy 
Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1509 (2009) (discussing how the “non-use 
benefits” of national air quality performance standards would be of “indeterminate 
value”). 
254 Sometimes Era IV laws were activated by agencies, such as the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, that relied on such laws to protect nonusers from the effects of 
resource use. 
255 See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, 515 U.S. 687, 708 (1995) (finding that 
the Endangered Species Act prohibition against “taking” a species encompasses 
destruction or modification of the habitat of the red-cockaded woodpecker and northern 
spotted owl). 
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This uncertainty was particularly the case for collaborative 
decision-making sessions when stakeholders (either users or 
nonusers) had incentives to engage in a sophisticated game to disguise 
their preferences, and form a voting block to misrepresent their 
interests and to further their objectives.256 Studies have shown that a 
number of variables can complicate a process in which users and 
nonusers, whose interests may support either indirect or nonuse 
values, met to vote on policy options. Examples of these complexities 
include ordering of status quo alternatives on the agenda during a 
voting process; the degree of required majority for a win to secure an 
alternative—i.e., simple majority or super majority; and transferable 
utility, which means that a nonuser would be willing to sacrifice the 
nonuse of a particular parcel of land if the nonuse is transferred to 
another parcel.257 
Such complex strategies during Era IV made it difficult to predict 
whether a cooperative or noncooperative game would actually take 
place. Noncooperative situations arise when self-interested players 
either are unwilling or unable to communicate, or cannot or do not 
trust each other, and so cannot make credible commitments to 
cooperative strategies. Throughout Era IV, users and nonusers found 
themselves in exactly this situation. Involvement from a 
governmental agency tasked with supporting multiple uses within the 
constraints of ecosystem service carrying capacities often yields 
options that trump the preferences of the other players. In other 
words, agency multiple-use policies such as U.S. Forest Service lands 
policies that permit multiple activities often yield a compromise that 
allocates some use to each party. However, this result does not 
necessarily mean that the players are pleased—the outcome may lead 
to malcontent. Regardless of whether the game is cooperative or 
noncooperative, when government agencies are involved the end 
result is still usually an overall suboptimal allocation of  
256 Bender, supra note 213 (“Although mandated to include the public in its decisions, 
the USDA Forest Service (USFS) can choose to undertake different types of public 
involvement. More recently, the USFS has embraced a collaborative (i.e., cooperative) 
decision-making process, which focuses on bringing stakeholders together for intensive 
education, communication and mediation to come to a consensus decision. In contrast, the 
purpose of the more traditional noncooperative National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) process is solely to educate interested parties about USFS activities and solicit 
information about the public’s desires. These models focus on comparing the results of 
non-cooperative public involvement models with the cooperative or collaborative 
models.”). 
257 Id. 
  
364 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 303 
environmental goods with respect to indirect use value or nonuse 
values. Government provisioning of environmental goods crowds out 
the private provisioning of these same goods.258 
Figure F demonstrates how a noncooperative solution between two 
players defaults to a suboptimal multiple use plan that encourages 
both extraction and wilderness use. Imagine in this particular scenario 
that the U.S. Forest Service is evaluating a proposal to permit timber 
extraction in a national forest within an area well known for its scenic 
vistas and wildlife viewing. 
The extraction proposal has triggered the need for an analysis of 
the environmental impacts under NEPA, which initiated considerable 
public involvement. For purposes of simplicity, we can break the 
groups into users who prefer the extraction option because it offers 
the potential to increase regional job availability and economic 
development, and nonusers—ardent environmentalists who truly 
prioritize existence values. In other words, environmentalists 
prioritize the nonuse values of these U.S. Forest Service lands, and 
these nonusers would prefer to see the area return to a natural state, to 
the point of closing visitor use even for hiking. The U.S. Forest 
Service, which is tasked with managing multiple uses, must consider 
all of these uses within the constraints of the ecosystem.259 In this 
noncooperative game, the Nash equilibrium of the U.S. Forest Service 
multiple use mandate facilitates both use and nonuse, but to a degree 
that does not fully satisfy either group.260 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
258 Bergstrom et al., supra note 211. 
259 See, e.g., Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. §§ 528–531 (2006). 
260 For the sake of simplicity, we model this game using pure strategies, where players 
do not assign probabilities to the outcome of the play. 
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Note that the number in each box reflects Player 1’s (timber 
interest) payoff on the left; the number on the right reflects Player 2’s 
payoff. The box containing the noncooperative solution for agency 
multiple use is highlighted. 
In Figure F, payoffs are based upon the number of acres of U.S. 
Forest Service lands that are allocated for each purpose, extraction 
and nonuse. Player 2 demonstrates considerable nonuse values for 
large wilderness areas (5). The wilderness area is compromised if 
extraction takes place, but Player 2 would prefer to see some 
wilderness maintained (3), even if less wilderness acreage is 
ultimately available. Player 1, with a timber interest, would prefer to 
see the lands converted to extraction (5). Maintaining the lands as 
wilderness areas would result in considerable profit losses to Player 1 
(-5); however, Player 1 receives some benefit (3) from multiple use. 
The Nash equilibrium occurs when Player 1 extracts and Player 2 
enjoys some wilderness, reflected in the lower left box. This set of 
strategies also demonstrates multiple use and a Pareto optimal 
solution, in terms of acreage allocated towards each use. Those who 
value wilderness benefit from the nonuse designation, and the timber 
harvester benefits by the ability to cut some timber. However, due to 
the nature of the use and nonuse activities, there is still room for 
externalities and conflict between users and nonusers, as well as 
within these groups. For example, clear-cutting produces spillover 
effects such as excessive runoff on the adjacent wilderness lands. 
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Conversely, the timber harvesters are frustrated by the wilderness 
designation, because they are unable to maximize profits from the 
available resource next door. Government ownership of a resource 
does not necessarily yield a socially optimal result.261 
D.  Private Provisioning of Nonuse Environmental Goods 
While a public ownership solution to the conflict between use and 
nonuse seemed elusive regarding lands and resources, so too did 
market-based solutions for the provisioning of environmental goods, 
common in the latter part of the twentieth century and early twenty-
first century. Cap and trade programs were implemented in the mid-
1990s to cap the total output of smog-inducing air emissions such as 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) and sulfur oxides (SOx). These cap-and-trade 
programs allowed firms to either buy or sell the right to emit pollution 
as appropriate for their manufacturing practices, while the industry as 
a whole was required to reduce total emissions. Firms were able to 
provide an environmental good, clean air, while deciding on the 
appropriate manufacturing processes to manage emissions and 
maximize profits.262 While imperfect in implementation, economists 
and other professionals applauded cap-and-trade practices as market-
based solutions, and the SOx cap-and-trade guidelines seemed to 
reduce this pollutant.263 The trading of greenhouse gases such as 
carbon dioxide also emerged in the twenty-first century. While such 
carbon markets were mandated in the European Union,264 the creation 
of the Chicago Climate Exchange—the first voluntary market for the 
trading of greenhouse gases—showed promise for trade in the United 
States.265 
 
261 COLE, supra note 105, at 39–40 (discussing public mismanagement of publicly 
owned “multiple use” resources); Thomas Borcherding, Natural Resources and 
Transgenerational Equity, in ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT: A RECONCILIATION 
95–115 (Walter Block ed., 1990) (public ownership of resources sometimes merely 
converts the tragedy of open access into the “tragedy of the political commons”). 
262 LESSER ET AL., supra note 2, at 156–59. 
263 COLE, supra note 140; Byron Swift, The Acid Rain Test, 14 ENVTL. FORUM 17 
(1997); Barry Wallerstein, Letter to the Editor, Our Cap and Trade NOx the SOx Off, 
WALL ST. J., April 25, 2009, at A10. 
264 See Emissions Trading System—Policies, EUROPEAN COMMISSION CLIMATE 
ACTION, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/index_en.htm (last updated Nov. 
15, 2010) (summarizing cap and trade requirements in the European Union). 
265 CHICAGO CLIMATE EXCHANGE, http://www.chicagoclimatex.com (last visited Nov. 
26, 2010). 
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In Era IV, other laws sought to provide private firms and 
landowners financial incentives to reduce externalities and to create 
public goods on their private property. Most notably, conservation 
easements evolved into one of the most common tools for protecting 
private lands that provide public goods possessing nonuse value, such 
as wildlife habitat, aesthetic views, or historical significance.266 With 
a conservation easement, land remains in private ownership, but the 
landowner enters into a contractual agreement to place restrictions on 
development or use of the land in return for benefits, which may 
include tax benefits and other forms of remuneration.267 In order to 
implement a conservation easement, a landowner must work with a 
conservation organization, usually a land trust, which enforces the 
agreement and agrees to ensure protection of the nonuse conservation 
values of the land. In the case of a donated conservation easement, the 
land trust facilitates the conservation easement contract, but does not 
directly pay the landowner. Not to be confused with transferable 
development rights, the conservation easement contract effectively 
extinguishes the land’s development use rights in perpetuity, 
regardless of whether the property is transferred at a future point in 
time to another owner.268 
Like emissions trading practices, conservation easements 
represented a market-based solution to a market failure. While 
emissions trading reduced the negative externality—i.e., air 
pollution—imposed upon the public from private industry, 
conservation easements sought to correct a positive externality. 
Without the corresponding tax breaks, the landowners with such 
easements are uncompensated for keeping land undeveloped and 
providing public goods such as wildlife habitat and scenic views.269 
Conservation easements and emissions trading were considered two 
rather successful market-based programs to provide landowners with  
266 John C. Bergstrom, B.L. Dillman & J.R. Stoll, Public Environmental Amenity 
Benefits of Private Land: The Case of Prime Agricultural Land, 17 S. J. AGRIC. ECON. 
139, 139–49 (1985); J. Wyerman, Private Land Conservation in U.S. Soars, LAND TRUST 
ALLIANCE (2006), http://www.landtrustalliance.org/events-news/alliance-news/private 
-land-conservation-in-u.s.-soars (last visited Nov. 16, 2010). 
267 Parkinson v. Bd. of Assessors, 495 N.E.2d 294 (Mass. 1986) (tax abatements 
permitted for valid conservation easements on taxpayer’s property). 
268 J.A. GUSTANSKI, PROTECTING THE LAND: CONSERVATION EASEMENTS PAST, 
PRESENT, AND FUTURE 1–14 (2000). 
269 See generally CATHERINE M. KESKE, RENTS, EFFICIENCY, AND INCOMPLETE 
MARKETS: THE EMERGING MARKET FOR PRIVATE LAND PRESERVATION AND 
CONSERVATION EASEMENTS (2008). 
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a financial incentive to internalize the externalities, and to supply a 
more optimal quantity of environmental goods and nonuse benefits. 
Although other similar trading programs, such as water markets, 
proved to be less successful and did not gain momentum due to 
information failures and high transactions costs,270 emissions trading 
and conservation easements showed that the market could in some 
cases act as an incentive for industry and private landowners to 
protect nonuse values from resource use. 
By the twenty-first century, however, concerns about the 
irreversibility of environmental damage and the rate of change in 
environmental quality in emerging economies such as India and 
China called into question whether the market could react quickly 
enough to provide nonuse benefits and environmental goods in the 
United States and worldwide.271 If the market had the potential to 
protect the environment and nonuse values in some cases, such as 
emissions trading programs and conservation easements, then why 
was there still a suboptimal level of environmental goods? A number 
of factors have contributed to this outcome: different discount rates 
between developed and developing nations;272 variability in the 
preferences for environmental goods within a nation;273 and 
differences of opinion between scientists about the level of existing 
environmental degradation.274 Publicly owned resources have also 
produced suboptimal levels of nonuse benefits. As shown by Figure F 
above, while government may allocate use and nonuse values on 
 
270 Janis M. Carey, David L. Sunding & David Zilberman, Transaction Costs and 
Trading Behavior in an Immature Water Market, 7 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 733, 733–750 
(2002); J.M. Carey & D.L. Sunding, Emerging Markets in Water: A Comparative Analysis 
of the Central Valley and Colorado-Big Thompson Projects, 14 NAT. RESOURCES J. 283, 
283–328 (2001). 
271 TYLER VOLK, CO2 RISING: THE WORLD’S GREATEST ENVIRONMENTAL 
CHALLENGE (2009); KERRY EMANUEL, WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT CLIMATE CHANGE 
(2009); JAMES GUSTAVE SPETH, THE BRIDGE AT THE END OF THE WORLD: CAPITALISM, 
THE ENVIRONMENT, AND CROSSING FROM CRISIS TO SUSTAINABILITY, 17–45 (2008). 
272 See Sebastian Edwards, Country Risk, Foreign Borrowing, and the Social Discount 
Rate in an Open Developing Economy, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, INC., 
Working Paper Number 1651 (1986). 
273 LYNNE KOONTZ & DANA L. HOAG, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, FORT COLLINS 
SCIENCE CENTER, ANALYZING STAKEHOLDER PREFERENCES FOR MANAGING ELK AND 
BISON AT THE NATIONAL ELK REFUGE AND GRAND TETON NATIONAL PARK: AN 
EXAMPLE OF THE DISPARATE STAKEHOLDER MANAGEMENT APPROACH OPEN-FILE 
REPORT 1224 (2005). 
274 Yuko Heath & Robert Gifford, Free Market Ideology and Environmental 
Degradation 38 ENV’T & BEHAVIOR 48, 48–71 (2006). 
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public lands, there is still not enough land and resources to meet 
everyone’s desires.275 
Failures of the market, limitations associated with government 
empowerment of individuals raising nonuse interests, and suboptimal 
results yielded by government ownership of public goods all lead to 
this conclusion: The only way to achieve an optimal amount of 
resource use is for humans to actually privatize the resource itself and 
bestow upon the resource legal rights so that the resource becomes its 
own player in a game of strategy. What seems to be needed is the 
legal formalization of the private provisioning of a public good, in 
order to prevent free-riding behaviors. This can be done by collective 
action or formation of small groups.276 Instead of relying on Era IV 
laws that create rights in people and institutions to raise nonuse values 
in resources for human-oriented ends, laws should give legal stature 
and protection to the resource itself, so that its nonanthropocentric, 
ecocentric interests may be advanced in a resource game.277 Through 
a series of elegant mathematical and economic models, several 
authors have shown that reliance on government alone to protect and 
assert nonuse values simply crowds out private solutions to relentless 
use activities threatening resource nonuse values.278 
VI 
ERA V—AN AGE OF ECOCENTRISM 
Despite the ubiquitousness of Era IV laws, which gave individuals, 
organizations, and governments the ability to raise their interest in 
resource nonuse, the Anthrocene Age still experienced escalating 
human demands on resource nonuse services.279 The questions that  
275 John B. Loomis & Catherine M. Keske, Mountain Substitutability and Peak Load 
Pricing of High Alpine Peaks as a Management Tool to Reduce Environmental Damage: A 
Contingent Evaluation Study, 90 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 1751, 1751–1760 (2009). 
276 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
277 Peter G. Warr, Pareto Optimal Redistribution and Private Charity, 19 J. PUB. ECON. 
131, 131–38 (1982); Peter G. Warr, The Private Provision of a Public Good Is 
Independent of the Distribution of Income, 13 ECON. LETTERS 207, 207–11 (1983). 
278 Bergstrom et al., supra note 211; Steven J. Eagle, Reflections on Private Property, 
Planning, and State Power, 61 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. 3 (2009); Harold Demsetz, Information 
and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969). 
279 See, e.g., CLIMATE CHANGE: WHAT IT MEANS FOR US, OUR CHILDREN, AND OUR 
GRANDCHILDREN (Joseph F.C. DiMento & Pamela M. Doughman eds., 2007); HARVEY 
BLATT, AMERICA’S ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT CARD: ARE WE MAKING THE GRADE? 
(2005); see also supra notes 267–71 and accompanying text. 
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arise from this failure are: Why are these laws and legal institutions 
unable to protect resource nonuse values? And what must be done to 
secure effective protection of the endangered nonuse component of 
resources? 
The answer to the first question in large part lies in the fact that Era 
IV laws, while purporting to protect resource nonuse values, in reality 
gave humans and their institutions the right to assert their own 
anthropocentric interests in resource nonuse.280 This human-centered 
focus has in turn been based on the standard economic assumption 
that environmental and resource policies should be assessed 
exclusively in terms of their effects on the well-being and preferences 
of individuals.281 The answer to the second question follows from the 
answer to the first: If laws that permit humans to raise their interests 
in resource nonuse cannot adequately deter human assaults on the 
planet’s natural resource base, then perhaps laws should give legal 
status to the resource itself, so that its nonanthropocentric, ecocentric 
interests may be protected. 
The establishment of a right of nonuse held by natural resources 
would permit resources to assert a legally acknowledged right to be 
left alone when threatened by human use desires. Such a right would 
also empower a third player in the natural resources game—the 
resource itself and its nonuse component. When the resource’s own 
nonuse interest must be reckoned with by the other two legally 
recognized resource players—users and nonusers raising human 
interests—the resulting resources game may finally yield a 
cooperative solution and an equilibrium that is a collectively optimal 
result. 
A.  Resource Endangerment Despite Era IV Laws 
Most of the resource nonuse laws put in place during Era IV rested 
on two pillars of standard microeconomic theory. First, based on the 
groundbreaking work of welfare economist A.C. Pigou, policy 
makers realized that pollution was an externality or social cost of 
production that required some non-market response to an otherwise 
intractable market failure.282 Era IV pollution control laws were in 
turn designed to constrain the health risks that one person may impose 
on another. These laws were also meant to internalize externalities  
280 See supra Part V.B. 
281 LESSER ET AL., supra note 2, at 40–43. 
282 See generally A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 172–203 (4th ed. 1932). 
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when resources such as air, water, and land are used as free dumping 
grounds for waste, thereby impairing the indirect use value that 
humans enjoy from unpolluted public environmental goods.283 
Second, based on the insight of John Krutilla and others that people 
value natural objects simply because they are natural when unused, 
policy makers also recognized that markets fail to respond to the 
nonuse value of natural objects that people want to preserve, but may 
not ever use, consume, or experience.284 As a consequence of this 
realization, statutes were enacted that preserved natural landscapes, 
landmarks, and living things such as endangered wildlife.285 
All these pollution prevention and resource preservation laws no 
doubt have helped to reduce the rate of pollution of public 
environmental goods and the degradation and destruction of natural 
objects. However, by the first decade of the twenty-first century it 
was becoming apparent that they had not been able to prevent four 
potentially catastrophic environmental threats. These drivers of 
planetary collapse include climate crisis,286 natural systems 
destruction,287 diminution of biomass productivity,288 and species 
extinction.289 Unlike pollution and impairment of natural objects, 
 
283 E.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2006); Noaki Schwartz, 60% in 
Nation Live in Dirty Air, DENV. POST, April 29, 2009, at 6A, available at http://www 
.denverpost.com/search/c:_12249820. 
284 See generally John V. Krutilla, Conservation Reconsidered, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 
777 (1967). 
285 See e.g., Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2006); Endangered Species Act, 
7 U.S.C. § 136, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 ; Antiquities Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431–433 (1906). 
286 See generally VOLK, supra note 271; MARK LYNAS, SIX DEGREES: OUR FUTURE 
ON A HOTTER PLANET (2007); EMANUEL, supra note 270; Dan Vergano & Doyle Rice, 
“Game Changer”: Report on Climate Change Urges Action, USA TODAY, June 17, 2009, 
at 6D, available at http://www.usatoday.com/weather/climate/globalwarming/2009-06-16 
-Climate_change_damage_n.htm; Mark Jaffe, Developing World’s Impact Rises in Ozone, 
DENV. POST, Feb. 19, 2009, at 12A, available at http://www.denverpost.com 
/headlines/ci_11738042. 
287 See generally JAMES LOVELOCK, THE REVENGE OF GAIA: EARTH’S CLIMATE 
CRISIS AND THE FATE OF HUMANITY (2006); TYLER VOLK, GAIA’S BODY: TOWARD A 
PHYSIOLOGY OF EARTH (2003); RUHL ET AL., supra note 7; REED F. NOSS ET AL., 
ENDANGERED ECOSYSTEMS OF THE UNITED STATES: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF 
LOSS AND DEGRADATION, app. A (1995), available at http://biology.usgs.gov/pubs 
/ecosys. 
288 VACLAV SMIL, THE EARTH’S BIOSPHERE: EVOLUTION, DYNAMICS AND CHANGE 
(2002); see THE WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE, VITAL SIGNS 2002, at 106 (2002). 
289 STEPHEN M. MEYER, THE END OF THE WILD (2006); Boris Worm et al., Impacts of 
Biodiversity Loss on Ocean Ecosystem Services, 314 SCIENCE 787 (2006); Council on 
Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality, 21st Ann. Rep. 137 (1990); Corneia Dean, 
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these four particular perils do not just threaten human welfare, they 
jeopardize the earth’s entire biosphere, irrespective of human 
preferences or needs.290 Passage of more Era IV–like pollution 
prevention and resource preservation laws seems doomed to fail.291 
After all, the four threats to planetary survival arose despite the 
existence of such laws. What is called for is something new—some 
response that does what existing law does not. 
B.  From Human Harm to Eco-Harm 
The distinguishing characteristic of Era IV laws was that they 
acknowledged a human preference that certain resources not be used, 
because the converse—resource use—was interfering with various 
human nonuse values. For example, use of public environmental 
goods as pollution sinks was thought to impair human health values, 
while use and development of wild lands and species habitat as 
economic commodities was thought to impair the existence value of 
natural objects people wanted to preserve. The laws that responded to 
these resource nonuse preferences were thereby either explicitly or 
implicitly anthropocentric.292 They assumed that the harms sought to 
be redressed were harms to humans, but not necessarily to the natural 
resource being overused by humans.293 
This human-centered view reflected in Era IV laws was, and is, 
consistent with one of the central tenets of welfare economics: Nature 
is valuable only as a means to the end of individual well-being, 
defined as the satisfaction of preferences. The goal of social policy, as 
reflected in laws, has therefore been to raise the level of human  
One-Third of U.S. Bird Species Endangered, Survey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2009, at 
A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/20/science/earth/20bird.html. 
290 SPETH, supra note 271; FRED PEARCE, WITH SPEED AND VIOLENCE: WHY 
SCIENTISTS FEAR TIPPING POINTS IN CLIMATE CHANGE (2007); Geoffrey Lean, A World 
Dying, But Can We Unite to Save It?, INDEPENDENT U.K., Nov. 18, 2007, available at 
http://www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate_change/a-world-dying-but-can-we      
-unite-to-save-it-400847.html. 
291 SHELLENBERGER & NORDHAUS, supra note 208. 
292 See supra Part V.B. 
293 See, e.g., Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1148–49 (2009) (“Anglo-
American courts . . . [are restricted] to redress or prevent actual or imminently threatened 
injury to persons . . . .”); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 
167, 181 (2000) (“[It] is not injury to the environment but injury to the plaintiff [that 
matters].”). See also Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 
485–86 n.126 (2008) (it is difficult “to sue to vindicate environmental interests . . . 
[because the relevant] harm . . . [is not] to the environment . . . [but] harm to the 
plaintiff”). 
  
2010] The Right of Nonuse 373 
welfare—or to maximize the social aggregate of utility—as much as 
natural resources allow.294 Legal resource policies are to be assessed 
exclusively in terms of their effects on individuals; conversely, a law 
or policy that is unrelated to individual well-being is largely 
irrelevant.295 Moreover, welfare economists argue that the satisfaction 
of individual preferences—and its collective product, social welfare—
is best tested by willingness to pay for environmental benefits such as 
nonuse values.296 For example, the reduction of pollution from public 
environmental goods is a preference reflected in environmental 
quality policies because humans are willing to pay for the 
enforcement of laws that protect the nonuse benefits of 
uncontaminated air, water, and soil.297 And the existence value of 
unused wild lands is a preference incorporated in laws authorizing 
conservation easements, because humans are willing to pay to have 
some lands go undeveloped.298 
These human-based laws are meant to legitimize resource nonusers 
so that nonusers can act as a countervailing force to user interests. But 
there is another stakeholder in natural resources conflicts that is 
usually not legally legitimated by Era IV laws—the resource itself. 
User-versus-nonuser conflicts are typically clashes between two 
classes of humans who are driven by individual self-interest where the 
central question for each class is: What is the outcome that is good for 
me? A question that is rarely asked during conflicts between users 
and nonusers is: What is the outcome that is good for the resource 
itself? 
Gradually, commentators are beginning to take recognition of the 
anthropocentrism inherent in traditional responses to environmental 
calamities, and the tensions that may arise when nonuse protections  
294 MARK SAGOFF, PRICE, PRINCIPLE, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 8–9 (2004). 
295 See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 16 (2002); 
EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 275 (1978) 
(“individual welfare is all that counts in making policy choices”); Kenneth Arrow et al., Is 
There a Rule for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 
272 SCIENCE 221, 221–22 (1996) (“[V]alues to be assigned to program effects . . . should 
be those of the affected individuals . . . .”). 
296 JAMES R. KAHN, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO ENVIRONMENTAL AND NATURAL 
RESOURCES (1998). 
297 See, e.g., Anne R. Carey & Karl Gelles, Environmental Concerns, USA TODAY, 
Apr. 28, 2009, at 1A (most adults worry a “great deal” about pollution of drinking water, 
river and lake pollution, and soil contamination by toxic waste). 
298 Margaret Jackson, Ruling Puts Value on Land Contribution, DENV. POST, May 12, 
2009, at 7B (U.S. Tax Court upholds conservation easement program allowing landowners 
to get tax deductions in exchange for restricting use development on their land). 
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are framed in human, but not necessarily environmental terms.299 
These commentators challenge human-centered value systems, and 
instead embrace the intrinsic worth of plants, animals, habitat, 
ecosystem, and natural resources irrespective of instrumental or 
economic worth.300 They also realize that protection of nonuse 
benefits primarily for human ends will likely fall short of meeting 
global environmental goals.301 Acknowledgement of ecocentric values 
suggests that legal norms should not be defined in purely 
anthropocentric terms, but must also acknowledge the ecocentric 
worth and benefit of natural resources when they are left alone by 
humans. 
Unfortunately, antipollution and preservation legislation continues 
to be framed in light of human benefits that derive from nonuse 
benefits,302 and environmental protection measures found in 
international law are also typically couched in human rights terms.303 
Although several state constitutions provide a legal right to a healthful 
environment, reviewing courts have ruled that these provisions refer 
only to human health, and not to non-human elements of the 
environment.304 These decisions are consistent with the prevailing 
view that conceives the natural environment and its resources as a 
mere good that serves to satisfy human needs, while possessing no 
intrinsic value. 
This anthropocentric perspective has not been able to halt the four 
harbingers of planetary collapse noted above in Part VI.A.305 What  
299 See, e.g., Günther Handl, Human Rights and Protection of the Environment, in 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 303–05 (Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause & 
Allan Rosas eds., 2001); DINAH SHELTON, ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS, PEOPLE’S RIGHTS 
(Philip Alsten ed., 2001). 
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“Our obligation to preserve nature is not just a responsibility to other people but the 
environment itself.” WILLETT KEMPTON, JAMES S. BOSTEN & JENNIFER A. HARTLEY, 
ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES IN AMERICAN CULTURE 113 (1997). 
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Overview, in HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES TO ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Alan E. 
Boyle & Michael R. Anderson eds., 1996). 
302 See supra Part V.B. 
303 Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized Under 
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(2001). 
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School Dist. No. Two v. Texaco, Inc., 2007 MT 183, 165 P.3d 1079, 1088 (Mont. 2007). 
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seems needed is an ecocentric view that begins with the assumption 
that the nonuse component of resources is a condition to all life on the 
planet, including but not limited to human health. It would follow 
then that legal institutions should do more than impose limitations on 
individual human freedom to exploit the use component of resources 
and allow individuals to assert the human benefits that arise from 
resource nonuse. Laws and legal norms should also recognize that 
natural resources are a good in their own right. Such laws would not 
have the protection of humans as the central focus, but instead would 
acknowledge the right to have the natural environment itself 
protected. 
C.  A Right of Nonuse 
and the Rise of a Third Player in the Resource Game 
The idea of affording legal rights to natural resources has not 
escaped the attention of courts or commentators. In Georgia v. 
Tennessee Copper Co.,306 the U.S. Supreme Court in 1907 expanded 
the scope of quasi-sovereign interests protected by state parens 
patriae suits from protecting not only the health of their citizens from 
public nuisances, but also to safeguarding land, air, and natural 
resources.307 In 1972, Professor Christopher Stone argued that states 
should not be the only advocates for natural resources. Stone 
proposed that natural objects should have the ability to raise their own 
unique interest in nonuse values and environmental quality.308 A 
landmark federal energy bill, the Clean Energy Act of 2009, designed 
to reduce greenhouse gases contributing to climate change, would 
encourage resource nonuse actions that have reverse global-warming 
effects by absorbing carbon dioxide.309 This bill would permit such 
resource nonuse decisions—e.g., a forest company not cutting trees it 
would otherwise harvest—to be marketed to resource users and 
polluters as offsets.310 Another ecocentric approach is reflected in 
Ecuador’s new Constitution, which gives “[n]atural communities and 
ecosystems . . . the unalienable right to exist, flourish[,] and evolve  
306 206 U.S. 230, 238–39 (1907). 
307 Id. at 237 (“[T]he state has an interest independent of . . . its citizens, in all the earth 
and air within its domain.”); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 499 (2007). 
308 Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights For 
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 456 (1972). 
309 H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2010). 
310 Michael Riley, Windfall For, or Waste of, Energy?, DENV. POST, June 27, 2009, at 
20A, available at http://www.denverpost.com/politics/ci_12701102?source=pkg. 
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. . . .”311 The Ecuadorian law explicitly measures environmental injury 
not to a person or people, but to the ecosystem; it creates a non-
anthropocentric right of nonuse in natural resources. 
These ecocentric measures are slowly moving us towards a 
paradigm that sees a natural resource as a good in its own right, not 
only as an instrument of human preference. Such a paradigm would 
value resources for the worth and benefit they provide the biosphere 
when they are left alone. But in order to resist human desires to use 
resources, one cannot rely only on humans raising their own interest 
in nonuse values by asserting an array of Era IV species chauvinistic 
laws. These laws have resulted in noncooperative resource games 
between users and nonusers, and they have not deterred climate 
change, natural systems destruction, biomass depletion, or species 
extinction. Instead, one should also create a legal right in the resource 
itself—a right of nonuse that acknowledges and empowers a third 
player in the natural resources game, the natural resource. 
A natural resource empowered by a legally cognizable “right of 
nonuse” would be able to affect and perhaps prevent human 
development, exploitation, and use of that resource when such use 
would substantially interfere with the nonuse qualities that are 
essential to natural ecocentric processes. These processes include the 
creation and perpetuation of clean air, water, and land capable of 
sustaining the biosphere. Natural processes also encompass the 
indirect uses that follow from human nonuse of resources listed in 
Table 1 above, such as carbon sequestration, uncontaminated fertile 
soils, contiguous parcels of undeveloped land for natural ecosystems, 
and moderated climate, weather, temperature, and precipitation. The 
planet itself benefits from these resource nonuse qualities, not just the 
one species on this planet that has been so intent on either 
aggressively using resources for purely anthropocentric ends, or 
conversely, preventing such uses for human health and existence 
values. A right of nonuse would permit the nonuse qualities for 
resources to be asserted for ecocentric purposes. 
A right of nonuse would establish an Era V game that now has 
three players: the user who relies on Era III laws permitting resource 
use; the nonuser who relies on Era IV laws protecting anthropocentric 
anti-pollution and resource preservation values; and the resource that 
can raise its Era V right of nonuse to sustain long-term ecocentric  
311 Clare Kendall, A New Law of Nature, GUARDIAN, Sept. 24, 2008, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/sep/24/equador.conservation. 
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benefits that are of worth to the entire biosphere. Because the resource 
has become a credible player, the dynamics of the Era IV two-player 
game between users and nonusers have changed. These two players 
have traditionally been locked in a noncooperative game where the 
best that can be expected is an uneasy Nash equilibrium, where 
neither can improve their condition without ending up in a less 
desirable situation. But as noted above in Figure E, when competing 
resource users clashed, or Figure F, when competing users and 
nonusers conflicted, this eventual Nash equilibrium outcome has not 
yielded a satisfactory, socially optimal result. The introduction of a 
third player—the resource—now able to raise its own interests, 
provides a critical incentive for coordination between users and 
nonusers. Coordination can bring about cooperation between these 
two human players that results in a Pareto optimal solution where 
everyone, and everything, is made better off.312 
The three players each have two choices. First, they may contribute 
to nonuse values, and this contribution in turn both benefits the 
viability of the biosphere and provides indirect uses consistent with 
human survival. Second, they may not contribute to nonuse values, 
which occurs when their choices either interfere with or are neutral 
towards the nonuse component of resources. The choice to contribute 
or not refers to whether the choice will provide or deny a payoff to the 
resource’s nonuse potential. In the case of a user or nonuser, the 
motive behind the choice may be anthropocentric, but the effect of 
this human choice is experienced by the resource. For example, a user 
may choose to not contribute by polluting, removing, or otherwise 
using the resource in a way that prevents the resource’s nonuse 
qualities from being realized. A nonuser may choose to contribute, 
either by financially supporting nonuse values—e.g., for option value, 
in order to recreate there in the future—or for existence value, 
knowing that a landscape will be preserved, or simply by the act of 
leaving the resource alone. 
The third player in this game, the resource, obviously has no 
opinions or volitional choices. The resource simply exists in one of 
two states. It can exist where humans leave it alone, so it can produce 
its nonuse benefits, or where humans use it, exploit it, and degrade it, 
in which case it cannot yield nonuse value. In Eras II and III, the 
resource was used in different ways by the user. In Era IV, nonusers  
312 See generally Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the Prisoners’ Dilemma: 
Coordination, Game Theory, and Laws, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209 (2009). 
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became players and were able to slow, deter, or halt resource use by 
asserting their human-centric interests in resource nonuse. In Era V, 
where the resource has been conferred a right of nonuse, the resource 
is no longer a passive reflection of user and nonuser interests; the 
resource now has the legal ability to protect its ecocentric nonuse 
capabilities. The choice for the Era V resource is to contribute 
towards the furtherance of nonuse values by affirmatively asserting its 
right of nonuse, or to not contribute by existing without imposing the 
nonuse right. 
The exercise of this choice to either assert or not assert the right of 
nonuse hinges on whether the user and nonuser, in a two-player game, 
decide to contribute to maintaining the resource and its nonuse 
benefits. Without the resource’s ability to raise its own right of 
nonuse, users and nonusers typically engaged in two-player 
noncooperative games of brinkmanship, previously diagrammed in 
Figures E and F. These games produced equlibria that were typically 
neither optimal for the parties nor optimal from the perspective of the 
larger society. When a third player is introduced into such a game, 
and where this third player has a legal voice in the outcome, the 
dynamics of the normal two-player game change. The fact that the 
resource can play its right of nonuse card alters the behavior of the 
users and nonusers when they play their two-player game. 
The right of nonuse does not necessarily need to be asserted by the 
resource in a three-player game; if the user and nonuser can 
coordinate their choices in light of an incipient future resource nonuse 
right, those two human players may engage in a cooperative game 
that yields a Pareto optimal solution. The role of a right of nonuse 
help by the resource, then, is not to bludgeon users and nonusers into 
accepting ecocentric nonuse values. It is to provide a mechanism that 
promotes the alteration of a noncooperative two-player, user-nonuser 
game into a cooperative game.313 
The three-player game is in fact a two-stage game.314 During the 
first stage, the users and nonusers simultaneously decide whether to 
contribute to maintaining the resource’s nonuse values and its 
concomitant indirect use benefits that humans thereby enjoy. During 
this first stage, both players know that the third player, the resource, 
holds a right of nonuse. Both players also know that the resource  
313 Robert Sugden, A Theory of Focal Points, 105 ECON. J. 533 (1995); McAdams, 
supra note 313, at 231. 
314 See Appendix for a more detailed description of this three-player game. 
  
2010] The Right of Nonuse 379 
would prefer that each player contribute to nonuse values and indirect 
use benefits. Furthermore, both players know during the first stage 
that the resource would rather not engage in an expensive legal action 
raising and defending the resource’s right of nonuse; the resource 
would prefer to be left alone, without imposing its legal nonuse right. 
This knowledge, along with the knowledge of the resource’s latent 
potential to assert its own nonuse interests, should serve as a catalyst 
during stage one to change what would have been noncooperative 
strategies into a cooperative solution between users and nonusers. 
If nonuse values remain threatened and if stage one has not 
produced a cooperative game, then the resource may step in and 
effectively act as a third player in the second stage of the game. By 
affirmatively asserting its Era V right of nonuse, the resource is now 
able to contribute to its continued existence. But it will formally 
trigger the right of nonuse only when the other two human players, 
the user and nonuser, are not willing to contribute. The resource will 
sequentially join in the game to maintain its self-interest only if the 
other two human players do not cooperatively protect ecocentric 
nonuse values and resulting anthropocentric indirect use values. It is 
the ability of the resource to effectively trump during stage two the 
noncooperating human players’ actions during stage one that makes 
this a three-player, two-stage game. And it is the acknowledgement of 
the resource as an independent player with intrinsic qualities—
providing planet-wide nonuse benefits that are not just defined by 
human utility—that permits this particular game to result in a socially 
optimal result. 
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APPENDIX 
ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE ERA V “RIGHT OF NONUSE” GAME 
In this game, it is known to all players that Player 3, the resource, 
now has the right to exist. Nonusers and users understand that the 
resource will prevail if one of the other players does not contribute to 
supporting the indirect use values. However, the sub-game requiring a 
different sequence of decisions between Player 1 and Player 2 is 
imperfect because it is not known whether either of these two players 
will take the strategy of contributing to indirect uses. This results in a 
simultaneous sub-game between users and nonusers, followed by a 
sequential game where the resource will contribute if the nonusers 
will not contribute. 
Figures G and H reflect a two-stage, three-by-three game, 
presented in a two-by-four matrix rather than a three-dimensional 
matrix. There are three payoffs that reflect indirect use values to each 
player based upon each player’s choices. The left-most payoff is that 
of Player 1, the user. The middle payoff reflects Player 2, the nonuser. 
The payoff furthest to the right is that of Player 3, the resource. The 
best payoff for each player, given the actions of the other players, is 
italicized. The payoff values can be explained as follows: 
• The resource receives the most benefit when both of the other 
players contribute (4) because indirect use benefits are least 
threatened. 
• The resource receives the second highest level of benefit (3) 
when one other player contributes and the resource does not 
need to contribute. 
• Players receive a benefit of 2 when one other player contributes 
to the resource and they do not, because these players are able to 
receive benefits from free riding on that player’s contribution. 
Users and nonusers also receive a benefit of 2 when both 
contribute, to reflect the cooperation and shared costs and 
benefits of maintaining indirect use benefits. 
• Players receive a benefit of 1 when they must contribute to the 
resource and other players do not do so. 
• Players receive a payoff of -1 when no one contributes, because 
the indirect use benefits of the parcel are destroyed. 
In the first stage, a sub-game between Player 1 (user) and Player 2 
(nonuser), should the user decide to contribute, the payoff to the 
nonuser is equal to 2, as the nonuser is able to free-ride to some 
extent. Should Player 1 (user) not contribute, the best that the nonuser 
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can do is a payoff of 1, because the nonuser is forced to contribute. 
This yields a payoff of 2 to the user, who is able to free-ride when the 
nonuser is forced to contribute. 
If Player 2 (the nonuser) decides to contribute, the best that Player 
1 (the user) can do is contribute, resulting in a payoff of 2. However, 
if the nonuser decides to not contribute, then the best that the user can 
do is to contribute, which results in a payoff of “1” to the user. In this 
case, the nonuser becomes the free-rider and receives a payoff of 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure G. Stage 1 in the three-player game of chicken. 
 
Note that the best payoff for each player, given the actions of the 
other players, is in bold. The payoffs are expressed in this order: 
Player 1 (user), Player 2 (nonuser), Player 3 (resource). 
After the first stage of this game, there are some interesting results. 
One result is that there are seven potential Nash equilibria. This will 
be resolved once the resource plays during the second stage. The 
second interesting result is that this game of chicken forces at least 
one player (either the user or the nonuser) to contribute to providing 
indirect use values. The box at lower right (-1,-1,-1) is not in 
consideration for the Nash equilibrium. 
The results of the second stage, the resource’s play, are presented 
in Figure H. The resource knows the results of the first stage, the sub-
game between the users and nonusers. Since the resource knows that 
others are willing to contribute and the resource prefers not to 
contribute, it will simply not play its first column (which 
encompasses the nonusers’ first two columns). This leaves the second 
column, Not Contribute, encompassing the nonusers second two 
columns for its actions. Therefore, the resource will choose the path 
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that provides it the highest payoff, given the actions of the other 
players. 
The resource will receive the highest payoff (4) if both Players 1 
and 2 contribute, and the resource itself does not contribute. This is 
also a Pareto optimal solution, and transaction costs may be 
minimized. While there are two other Nash equilibria, as Player 3 
plays a sub-game with each of the players, its payoff of 4 each 
selected twice (hence, the value is in shaded). The effect of giving the 
resource a right of nonuse means that the best action for both users 
and nonusers to take is to contribute to the indirect uses maintained by 
the resource. The right of nonuse has effectively created a quasi-
cooperative game. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure H. Stage 2 in the three-player game of chicken. 
 
Note that the best payoff for each player, given the actions of the 
other players, is in bold. The payoffs are expressed in this order: 
Player 1 (user), Player 2 (nonuser), Player 3 (resource). Player 3, the 
resource, knows the outcome of the first stage game and only chooses 
to play its last column, i.e., not contribute. The Pareto optimal 
solution is for users and nonusers to contribute, which provides the 
Resource a payoff of 4. If the resource plays the sub-game, the payoff 
of 4 is selected twice, and the solution is shaded. 
The three-player chicken game demonstrates that by giving a right 
of nonuse to the resource, other players have incentive to contribute to 
upholding indirect uses provisioned by the resource, and the resource 
itself can simply exist. In a sense, the resource has induced 
cooperation. While this game shows that this option is feasible, there 
are challenges in the implementation of such laws. Chiefly, there 
becomes a principal-agent problem, where a human must infer and 
represent nature and what nature wants despite the fact that nature 
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cannot articulate what it desires and scientists may disagree about 
what it wants. Furthermore, environmental philosophers have debated 
the rights of the species versus the rights of the individual members of 
the species, coming down on both sides of the issue. In other words, 
should the set of species as a whole be optimized, or should the 
welfare of each individual species members be optimized? Federal 
agencies such as the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service have already 
implemented a similar perspective, such as the goal of no net loss of 
wetlands, although the individual wetlands are somewhat put at risk. 
There is also the matter of defining when nature has veto power 
over human interests and can impose policies arbitrarily on humans, 
such as a tax on clean air for the use of human respiration. However, 
based upon the three-player game shown in Figures G and H, we can 
see that the right of nonuse can provide the proper incentives for users 
and nonusers to contribute to the well-being of the resource and the 
indirect use values that result. 
  
384 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 25, 303 
 
 
